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SUPERIOR COURT OF WA. SHOROW K. FOGO
BY DEPUTY

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF WASHINGTON IN AND FOR MASON COUNTY

JOSEPH A. SHELTON and SHAWNA SHELTON, a married couple, and SHAWNA SHELTON as her separate property, Plaintiffs,

VS.

BRIAN NULL, and JANE DOE NULL, and any other occupants,

Defendant(s).



NO. 22-2-00076-23

MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTIVE RELIEF and MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT

COME NOW the Plaintiffs, JOSEPH A. SHELTON and SHAWNA SHELTON, a married couple, and SHAWNA SHELTON, as her separate property, by and through their attorneys STEPHEN WHITEHOUSE & JULIE NICHOLS of WHITEHOUSE & NICHOLS, LLP, and moves this court for an Order Granting Preliminary Injunction. This motion is based on the following Memorandum of Law as well as the verified Complaint filed herewith.



I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiffs purchased two parcels in the Shorecrest neighborhood of Mason County in March and June 2021.

Soon after the purchases of the two parcels were closed, Plaintiffs caused a survey of the property to be completed. It confirmed that the Defendant(s) was occupying and

MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

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causing damage to the subject property, as shown in photos referenced in paragraph 3.11 of the verified Complaint.

Defendant refuses to vacate, despite having no legal claim to remain on the property. In the past several months, Defendant has proceeded to cut down trees, dig ditches, and construct outbuilding(s) on the property. All of these actions are without authorization and illegal.

The underlying lawsuit asks for ejectment, quiet title, damages both a preliminary and a permanent injunction prohibiting Defendant(s) from continuing to occupy the property unlawfully. The Court is asked to enter a temporary restraining order requiring Defendant(s) to vacate.

II. DEFENDANT(S) IS EITHER: TENANT AT SUFFERANCE, LICENSEE WHOSE PERMISSION HAS BEEN REVOKED, or TENANT AT WILL --BUT ARE IS MERE TRESPASSER.

There is not any rental, or lease, or tenancy, between Plaintiffs and Defendants.

As a courtesy, Plaintiffs had delivered a final notice to vacate on or around January 10, 2022, giving the Defendant until January 25, 2022. This final notice is attached to the verified Complaint as Exhibit D, incorporated by reference therein.

Out of the possible state statutory schemes that can apply to various tenancies and their termination, none is believed to apply squarely to these facts, for the obvious reasons that (1) this scenario was never a tenancy, (2) Defendant never had any rights in the property of Plaintiffs, and (3) there was never any other aspect of a tenancy relationship between them.

MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

Page 2 of 6

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Defendant is now a trespasser and Plaintiffs are entitled to possession of the subject property according to the analysis set forth below.

A. RCW chapter 59.18 Residential Landlord Tenant Act does not apply.

This statute applies to the rental or leasing of residences to tenants. A tenant is defined as "any person who is entitled to occupy a dwelling unit primarily for living or dwelling purposes under a rental agreement." RCW 59.18.030(21) (emphasis added). There is no rental agreement here.

B. Defendant is either a tenant at sufferance, or a licensee whose permission has been revoked.

RCW chapter 59.04 only applies to tenancies, which are not defined by the statute. All sections refer to either leases or payment of rent. RCW 59.04.050 does provide that whenever "any person obtains possession of premises without the consent of the owner... he shall be deemed a tenant by sufferance...."

This statute goes on to say that Plaintiffs are entitled to possession "immediately upon said demand." Id.

Plaintiffs believe the Defendant entered without permission, but in the event that Defendant did enter with permission initially, he would be considered a licensee and is in the property under what we know as a "tenancy at will." This arrangement can be terminated, obviously, "at will." The owner has to give a reasonable time for the tenant to vacate. Najewitz v. Seattle, 21 Wash. 2d 656 (1944). This reasonable notice has been provided, as provided in the verified Complaint. Once permission was revoked, then Defendant became a trespasser.

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A trespasser is defined by WPI 120.01 as one "who enters or remains upon the premises of another without permission...."

As to remaining unlawfully,

"Unlawful remaining" occurs when (1) a person has lawfully entered a dwelling pursuant to license, invitation or privilege; (2) the invitation, license or privilege is expressly or impliedly limited; (3) the person's conduct violates such limits; and (4) the person's conduct is accompanied by intent to commit a crime in the dwelling. State v. Thomson, 71 Wash.App. 634, 640, 861 P.2d 492 (1993)(citing RCW 9A.52.030(1); RCW 9A.52.020(1); RCW 9A.52.010(3); State v. Collins, 110 Wash.2d 253, 751 P.2d 837 (1988); State v. Rio, 38 Wash.2d 446, 230 P.2d 308, cert. denied, 342 U.S. 867, 72 S.Ct. 106, 96 L.Ed. 652 (1951)); RCW 9A.52.025(1); RCW 9A.04.110(7).

State v. Crist, 80 Wash. App. 511, 514 (1996).

Despite repeated and reasonable notice, Defendant refuses to vacate and is doing damage to the property.

Plaintiffs are entitled to an Order restoring immediate possession of the property.

IV. PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION, CR 65(a)

When it appears by the complaint that the plaintiff is entitled to the relief demanded and the relief, or any part thereof, consists in restraining the commission or continuance of some act, the commission or continuance of which during the litigation would produce great injury to the plaintiff; ...an injunction may be granted to restrain such act or proceedings until the further order of the court, which may afterwards be dissolved or modified upon motion.

RCW 7.40.020. "The injunction may be granted at the time of commencing the action, or at any time afterwards, before judgment in that proceeding." RCW 7.40.040. Reasonable notice is required, RCW 7.40.050, and has been given. An injunction bond is

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required, in an amount "sufficient to pay all damages and costs which may accrue by reason of the injunction...." RCW 7.40.080; CR 65(c).

Bond. The amount of the bond is within the discretion of the Court. *Hockley v. Hargitt*, 82 Wash.2d 337, (1973) (\$500,000 bond requested, \$1,000 bond ordered, Defendant failed to provide any specific information about need for bond and potential damages).

Plaintiffs respectfully request that the Court consider that Defendant has absolutely no right to stay on the subject property; and that Defendants have received repeated requests to surrender the property. Further, as outlined in the verified Complaint, Defendant is cutting trees, building structures and digging ditches on the property, without permits or authorization. This creates immediate and continuing legal exposure for the Plaintiffs.

Any damages from the issuance of a wrongful injunction would have to be premised on a finding that Defendant has a right to continue to live on the property, an unusual proposition under these circumstances. Otherwise, forcing Defendant to leave now simply *lessens* the amount of damages that will be sought against Defendant for their timber trespass, trespass/waste, nuisance and damages, by reducing the number of days Defendant commits these wrongs.

For the reasons stated herein, Plaintiffs recommend a cash bond of \$200.

The Defendant is bound by the Court's injunction as soon as the bond required by the Court is posted, because he will have been served with the application for the injunction. RCW 7.40.130.

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Page 5 of 6

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As this Court is aware, the form of the preliminary injunction must meet the requirements of CR 65:

(d) Form and Scope. Every order granting an injunction and every restraining order shall set forth the reasons for its issuance; shall be specific in terms; shall describe in reasonable detail, and not by reference to the complaint or other document, the act or acts sought to be restrained; and is binding only upon the parties to the action, their officers, agents, servants, employees, and attorneys, and upon those persons in active concert or participation with them who receive actual notice of the order by personal service or otherwise.

In addition, findings of fact and conclusions of law are required, CR 52(a)(2)(A).1

Writ of Assistance or Writ of Restitution. As part of the preliminary relief, Plaintiff requests the Court issue an Order granting Writ of Assistance, allowing the Sheriff to enter and remove Defendant from the subject property if Defendant has not surrendered the property at the time they are bound by the Court's injunction.

Respectfully submitted this _____ day of February, 2021.

STEPHEN WHITEHOUSE, WSBA #6818 JULIE NICHOLS, WSBA #37685 WHITEHOUSE & NICHOLS, LLP Attorneys for Plaintiffs

WHITEHOUSE & NICHOLS, LLP

¹ Plaintiffs respectfully request, pursuant to CR 65(a)(2), that the hearing on her application for a preliminary injunction be consolidated with the trial of the action on the merits.