{"id":29031,"date":"2023-06-16T00:07:52","date_gmt":"2023-06-16T07:07:52","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/amicuscuria.com\/wordpress\/?p=29031"},"modified":"2023-06-16T00:07:52","modified_gmt":"2023-06-16T07:07:52","slug":"13-scotus-decisions-on-parenting","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"http:\/\/amicuscuria.com\/wordpress\/13-scotus-decisions-on-parenting\/","title":{"rendered":"13 SCOTUS Decisions on\u00a0Parenting!"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

Thirteen SCOTUS Decisions on Parenting!<\/strong>
by T. Matthew Phillips, Attorney-at-Law<\/strong>
<\/em>U.S. Supreme Court Bar No. 317048<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

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Meyer vs. Nebraska \u2014 (1923<\/strong>)<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Meyer vs. Nebraska<\/u><\/em>,262 U.S. 390 (1923):  One hundred years ago, SCOTUS first recognized the right to parent as a \u201cliberty\u201d interest that the 14th Amendment guarantees.  Mr. Meyer, a school-teacher, was convicted on a criminal statute for teaching the German language, in a parochial school, to a 10-year-old.  SCOTUS held that the statute invaded the \u201cliberty\u201d interest that the 14th Amendment guarantees.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

SCOTUS ruled that the 14th Amendment, \u201cdenotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint, but also the right of the individual<\/em><\/strong> to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children<\/em><\/strong>, to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men,\u201d [Meyer vs. State of Nebraska<\/u><\/em>, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923); (bold italics added)].<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u201cCorresponding to the right of control, it is the natural duty of the parent to give his children education suitable to their station in life,\u201d [id<\/em>. at 400].  \u201cHis right thus to teach and the right of parents to engage him so to instruct their children, we think, are within the liberty of the Amendment,\u201d [id<\/em>. at 400].<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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Pierce vs. Society of Sisters \u2013 (1925)<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Pierce vs. Society of Sisters<\/u><\/em>, 268 U.S. 510 (1925):  SCOTUS held that the 14th Amendment \u201cliberty\u201d interest excludes any general power of the State to standardize its children \u2014 by forcing them to accept instruction from public teachers only.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u201cThe child is not the mere creature of the State<\/em><\/strong>; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations,\u201d [Pierce vs. Society of Sisters, <\/em>268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925); (bold italics added)].<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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Prince vs. Massachusetts \u2013 (1944)<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Prince vs. Massachusetts<\/u><\/em>, 321 U.S. 158 (1944):  SCOTUS struck-down a state statute, which provided that no minor shall sell, in public places, any newspapers, magazines or periodicals.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u201cIt is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents<\/em><\/strong>, whose primary function and freedom include preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder . . . And it is in recognition of this that these decisions have respected the private realm of family life<\/em><\/strong> which the state cannot enter,\u201d [Prince vs. Commonwealth of Massachusetts<\/u><\/em>, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944); (bold italics added)].<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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Stanley vs. Illinois \u2013 (1972)<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Stanley vs. Illinois<\/u><\/em>, 405 U.S. 645 (1972):  Under state law, children of unmarried fathers, upon the death of the mother, were declared wards of the state \u2014 with no hearing on the father\u2019s fitness and no proof of child neglect by the father.  The Illinois Supreme Court held that a father could be separated from his children upon mere proof that he and the dead mother were not married and they further held that father\u2019s fitness was irrelevant.  SCOTUS reversed, holding that unmarried fathers have a 14th Amendment liberty interest in raising their children. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u201c[T]he State registers no gain towards its declared goals when it separates children from the custody of fit parents,\u201d [Stanley vs. Illinois<\/u><\/em>, 405 U.S. 645 (1972)].<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u201cUnder the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment petitioner was entitled to a hearing on his fitness <\/em><\/strong>as a parent before his children were taken from him<\/em><\/strong>,\u201d [id<\/em>. at 645; (bold italics added].  \u201cParental unfitness must be established on the basis of individualized proof,\u201d [id<\/em>. at 645].<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u201cThe private interest here, that of a man in the children he has sired and raised, undeniably warrants deference and, absent a powerful countervailing interest, protection,\u201d [id<\/em>., at 651].  \u201cWe think the Due Process Clause mandates a similar result here.  The State\u2019s interest in caring for Stanley\u2019s children is de minimis<\/em> if Stanley is shown to be a fit father,\u201d [id<\/em>., at 658].<\/p>\n\n\n\n

SCOTUS ruled that, under the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment, father was \u201centitled to a<\/em><\/strong> hearing on [his] fitness<\/em><\/strong>\u201d as a parent before the state took his children and placed them in guardianships, [id<\/em>., at 647\u2013658; (bold italics added)].<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Under the Due Process Clause, the state cannot \u201cjustify refusing a father a hearing when the issue at stake is the dismemberment of his family,\u201d [id<\/em>. at 658]. \u201c[A]ll Illinois parents are constitutionally entitled to a hearing on their fitness<\/em><\/strong> before their children are removed from their custody,\u201d [id<\/em>., at 658; (bold italics added)].<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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Wisconsin vs. Yoder \u2013 (1972)<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Wisconsin vs. Yoder<\/u><\/em>, 406 U.S. 205 (1972):  Members of the Amish community were convicted for violating the State\u2019s compulsory school attendance law.  SCOTUS reversed these convictions under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u201cThe values of parental direction of the religious upbringing and education of  their children in their early and formative years have a high place in our society,\u201d [Wisconsin vs. Yoder<\/u><\/em>, 406 U.S. 205, at 213\u2013214 (1972)].  \u201cEven more markedly than in Prince<\/em>, therefore, this case involves the fundamental interest of parents<\/em><\/strong>, as contrasted with that of the State, to guide the religious future and education<\/em><\/strong> of their children<\/strong><\/em>,\u201d [id<\/em>., at 232; (bold italics added)].  \u201cThis primary role of the parents<\/em><\/strong> in the upbringing of their children is now established beyond debate as an enduring American tradition,\u201d [id<\/em>., at 232; (bold italics added)].<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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Moore vs. East Cleveland \u2013 (1977)<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Moore vs. East Cleveland<\/u><\/em>, 431 U.S. 494 (1977):  An Ohio housing ordinance limited occupancy of dwelling units to members of a single family; however, the ordinance defined \u201cfamily\u201d in such a way that one particular household \u2014 consisting of a mother, her son, and her two grandsons \u2014 did not qualify for occupancy, and in fact, constituted a crime.  SCOTUS overturned the mother\u2019s criminal conviction.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u201cOur decisions establish that the Constitution protects the sanctity of the family<\/em><\/strong> precisely because the institution of the family is deeply rooted in this Nation\u2019s<\/strong><\/em> history and tradition<\/em><\/strong>.  It is through the family that we inculcate and pass down many of our most cherished values, moral and cultural,\u201d [Moore vs. East Cleveland<\/u><\/em>, 431 U.S. 494, at 503\u2013504 (1977); (bold italics added)].<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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Smith vs. Organization of Foster Families \u2013 <\/a>(1977)<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Smith vs. Organization of Foster Families<\/u><\/em>, 431 U.S. 816 (1977):  This case raised the novel question of whether foster homes are entitled to the same constitutional deference as biological families.  SCOTUS ruled that, \u201c[t]he liberty interest in family privacy<\/em><\/strong> has its source, and its contours are ordinarily to be sought, not in state law, but in intrinsic human rights<\/em><\/strong>, as they have been understood in \u201cthis Nation\u2019s history and tradition.\u201d \u201d [Smith vs. Organization of Foster Families<\/u><\/em>, 431 U.S. 816, 845 (1977), citing Moore vs. East Cleveland<\/u><\/em>, 431 U.S. 494, at 503; (bold italics added)].<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u201cIf a State were to attempt to force the breakup of a natural family, over the objections of the parents and their children, without some showing of unfitness<\/em><\/strong> and for the sole reason that to do so was thought to be in the children\u2019s best interest<\/em><\/strong>, I should have little doubt that the State would have intruded impermissibly on \u201cthe private realm of family life which the state cannot enter<\/em><\/strong>,\u201d \u201d [Smith<\/u><\/em>, supra<\/em>, at 862-863, citing Prince vs. Massachusetts<\/u><\/em>, 321 U. S. 158, 166 (1944); (bold italics added)].<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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Quilloin vs. Walcott \u2013 (1978)<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Quilloin vs. Walcott<\/u><\/em>, 434U.S. 246 (1978):  Georgia law required only the mother\u2019s consent for the adoption of an illegitimate child.  Here, an unmarried father tried to halt adoption of his illegitimate child.  However, the father had taken no steps to support or legitimate the child over a period of 11 years; so too, the father had never been a member of the child\u2019s family unit.  As a result, SCOTUS upheld the adoption.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u201cWe have recognized on numerous occasions that the relationship between parent and child is constitutionally protected<\/em><\/strong>,\u201d [Quilloin  vs. Walcott<\/u><\/em>, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978); (bold italics added)].  \u201cWe have little doubt that the Due Process Clause would be offended, \u201c<\/a>if a State were to attempt to force the breakup of a natural family, over the objections of the parents and their children, without some showing of unfitness<\/em><\/strong> and for the sole reason that to do so was thought to be in the children\u2019s best interest<\/em><\/strong>,\u201d \u201d [Quilloin<\/u><\/em>, supra<\/em>, at 255; citing Smith vs. Organization of Foster Families<\/u><\/em>, 431 U.S. 816, 862-863 (1977); (bold italics added)].<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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Parham vs. J.R. \u2013 (1979)<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Parham vs. J. R<\/u><\/em>., 442 U.S. 584 (1979):  SCOTUS validated the State\u2019s procedures for admitting children to state mental hospitals.  \u201cThe law\u2019s concept of the family rests  on a presumption that parents possess what a child lacks in maturity, experience, and capacity for judgment required for making life\u2019s difficult decisions.  More important, historically it has recognized that natural bonds of affection lead parents to act<\/em><\/strong> in the best interests<\/em><\/strong> of their children,\u201d [Parham vs. J. R.<\/u><\/em>, 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979); (bold italics added)].<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u201cThe statist notion that governmental power should supersede parental authority  in all cases because some parents abuse and neglect children is repugnant to American tradition,\u201d [Parham vs. J. R.<\/u><\/em>, 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979)].  \u201cSimply because the decision of a parent is not agreeable to a child or because it involves risks does not automatically transfer the power to make that decision from the parents to some agency or officer of the state,\u201d [id<\/em>., at 603].  \u201c[W]e conclude that our precedents permit the parents to retain a substantial, if not the dominant, role in the decision, absent a finding of neglect or abuse<\/em><\/strong>, and that the traditional presumption that the parents act in the best interests of their child should apply,\u201d [id<\/em>. at 604; (bold italics added)].<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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Santosky vs. Kramer \u2013 (1982)<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Santosky vs. Kramer<\/u><\/em>, 455 U.S. 745 (1982):  Under New York law, the state could terminate, over parental objection, the rights of parents in their children \u2014 upon a finding that the child is permanently neglected.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u201cThe fundamental liberty interest of natural parents<\/em><\/strong> in the care, custody, and management of their child does not evaporate simply because they have not been model parents or have lost temporary custody of their child to the State,\u201d [Santosky vs. Kramer<\/u><\/em>, 455 U.S. 745 (1982); (bold italics added)].  \u201cEven when blood relationships are strained, parents retain a vital interest in preventing the irretrievable destruction of their family life,\u201d [id<\/em>., at 753].  <\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u201cBefore a State may sever completely and irrevocably the rights of parents in their natural child, due process requires that the State support its allegations by at least clear and convincing evidence<\/em><\/strong>,\u201d [id<\/em>., at 746; (bold italics added)].  \u201c[U]ntil the State proves parental unfitness<\/em><\/strong>, the child and his parents share a vital interest in preventing erroneous termination of their natural relationship<\/strong><\/em>,\u201d [id<\/em>., at 760); (bold italics added)].<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u201c[T]he parens patriae<\/em> interest favors preservation<\/em><\/strong>, not severance<\/em><\/strong>, of natural familial bonds,\u201d [id<\/em>., at 767\u2013768); (bold italics added)].  \u201cNor is it clear that the State constitutionally could terminate a parent\u2019s rights without showing parental unfitness<\/em><\/strong>,\u201d [id<\/em>., at footnote 10; (bold italics added)].  \u201cAny parens patriae<\/em> interest in terminating the natural parents\u2019 rights arises only at the dispositional phase, after the parents have been found unfit,\u201d [id<\/em>., at footnote 17].<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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Rotary Int\u2019l vs. Rotary Club of Duarte \u2013 (1987)<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Rotary Int\u2019l vs. Rotary Club of Duarte<\/u><\/em>, 481 U.S. 537 (1987):  Rotary Int\u2019l excluded women from membership, while Rotary Duarte admitted women; as a result, Rotary Int\u2019l terminated Rotary Duarte\u2019s membership in the international organization.  By requiring Rotary Clubs in California to admit women, California\u2019s anti-discrimination statute does not<\/em> violate the First Amendment.  So too,  the statute did not unduly interfere with club members\u2019 freedom of private association.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u201cWe have emphasized that the First Amendment protects <\/strong><\/em>those relationships, including family relationships<\/em><\/strong>, that presuppose \u201cdeep attachments and commitments to the necessarily few other individuals with whom one shares not only a special community of thoughts, experiences, and beliefs, but also distinctively personal aspects of one\u2019s life.\u201d \u201d [Rotary Int\u2019l vs. Rotary Club of Duarte<\/u><\/em>, 481 U.S. 537, 545 (1987), citing, Roberts vs. United States Jaycees<\/u><\/em>, 468 U.S. 609, 619-620 (1984); (bold italics added)].<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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Reno vs. Flores \u2013 (1993)<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Reno vs. Flores<\/u><\/em>, 507 U.S. 292 (1993):  Immigration and Naturalization Service regulation provided that alien juveniles \u2014 detained on suspicion of being deportable \u2014 may be released only to a parent, legal guardian, or other related adult.  SCOTUS held that the regulation accords with the Due Process Clause and the Immigration and Nationality Act.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

SCOTUS held that the Due Process Clause provides heightened protection against government interference with fundamental rights and liberty interests, [Reno vs. Flores<\/u><\/em>, 507 U.S. 292, 301-302 (1993)].<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u201c \u201cThe best interests of the child,\u201d a venerable phrase familiar from divorce proceedings, is a proper and feasible criterion for making the decision as to which of two parents will be accorded custody.  But it is not traditionally the sole criterion \u2014 much less the sole constitutional<\/em> criterion \u2014 for other, less narrowly channeled judgments involving children, where their interests conflict in varying degrees with the interests of others,\u201d [Reno vs. Flores<\/u><\/em>, 507 U.S. 292, 304 (1993)].<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u201c\u00a0<\/em><\/strong>\u201c[T]he best interests of the child\u201d is not the legal standard<\/em><\/strong>\u00a0that governs parents\u2019 or guardians\u2019 exercise of their custody: So long as certain minimum requirements of child care are met, the interests of the child may be subordinated to the interests of other children, or indeed even to the interests of the parents or guardians themselves,\u201d [id<\/em>., at 304; (bold italics added)].<\/p>\n\n\n\n

<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Troxel vs. Granville \u2013 (2000)<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Troxel vs. Granville<\/u><\/em>, 530 U.S. 57 (2000):  The State of Washington had allowed \u201cany person\u201d to petition for visitation rights, and further allowed family courts to grant visitation where it served a child\u2019s \u201cbest interests.\u201d  The grandparents, (the Troxels), successfully petitioned for visitation with the children of their deceased son.  The mother, (Granville), objected to the amount of visitation ordered.  The Washington Supreme Court held that state law unconstitutionally infringed on the mother\u2019s fundamental right to parent.  SCOTUS affirmed, holding that the Washington law, as applied, exceeded the bounds of the Due Process Clause.  \u201cFirst, the Troxels did not allege, and no court has found, that Granville was an unfit parent.  There is a presumption that fit parents act in their children\u2019s best interests<\/em><\/strong>,\u201d [Troxel vs. Granville<\/u><\/em>, 530 U.S. 57, citing Parham vs. J. R.<\/u><\/em>, 442 U.S. 584, 602; (bold italics added)].<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u201c[T]here is normally no reason for the State to inject itself into the private realm  of the family to further question fit parents\u2019 ability to make the best decisions regarding their children,\u201d [Troxel vs. Granville<\/u><\/em>, 530 U.S. 57 (2000), citing Reno vs. Flores<\/u><\/em>, 507 U.S. 292, at 304 (1993)].<\/p>\n\n\n\n

According to the Washington Supreme Court, \u201cthe Constitution permits a State to interfere with the right of parents to rear their children only to prevent harm or potential harm to a child<\/em><\/strong>,\u201d [id<\/em>. at 57; (bold italics added)].  The state statute was too broad; it allowed \u201cany person\u201d to petition, with the only requirement being whether visitation served the child\u2019s \u201cbest interests.\u201d  States may interfere with the right to parent only to prevent harm to a child.  \u201c[T]here is normally no reason for the State to inject itself into the private realm of the family<\/em><\/strong> to further question fit parents\u2019 ability to make the best decisions regarding their children,\u201d [Troxel vs. Granville<\/u><\/em>, 530 U.S. 57, 58 (2000); (bold italics added)]. \u201c[T]he State lacks a compelling interest in second-guessing a fit parent\u2019s decision regarding visitation with third parties,\u201d [id<\/em>. at 58].<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u201cThe liberty interest at issue in this case \u2014 the interest of parents in the care<\/strong><\/em>, custody<\/strong><\/em>, and control of their children<\/strong><\/em> \u2014 is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests <\/strong><\/em>recognized by this Court,\u201d [Troxel vs. Granville<\/u><\/em>, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000); (bold italics added)].<\/p>\n\n\n\n

SCOTUS noted that \u201cthe Troxels did not allege, and no court has found, that Granville was an unfit parent.  That aspect of the case is important, for there is a presumption that fit parents act in the best interests of their children,\u201d [id<\/em>. at 68].<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u201cIn effect, the judge placed on Granville, the fit custodial parent, the burden of disproving that visitation would be in the best interest of her daughters,\u201d [id<\/em>. at 69].  \u201cIn that respect, the court\u2019s presumption failed to provide any protection for Granville\u2019s fundamental constitutional right to make decisions concerning the rearing of her own daughters,\u201d [id<\/em>. at 69\u201370].  \u201cNeedless to say, however, our world is far from perfect, and in it the decision whether such an intergenerational relationship would be beneficial in any specific case is for the parent to make in the first instance.  And, if a fit parent\u2019s decision of the kind at issue here becomes subject to judicial review, the court must accord at least some special weight to the parent\u2019s own determination,\u201d [id<\/em>. at 70].<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u201cThe Washington Superior Court failed to accord the determination of Granville, a fit custodial parent, any material weight,\u201d [id<\/em>. at 72].  \u201cAs we have explained, the Due Process Clause does not permit a State to infringe on the fundamental right of parents to make child rearing decisions simply because a state judge believes a \u2018better\u2019 decision could be made,\u201d [id<\/em>. at 72\u201373].<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u201cWe have long recognized that a parent\u2019s interests in the nurture, upbringing, companionship, care, and custody of children are generally protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,\u201d [id<\/em>. at 77].<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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These Supreme Court case law citations form the basis of our proposed Parental Bill of Rights (click below!)<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Parental Bill of\u00a0Rights<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

\"\"<\/figure>\n\n\n\n

THE PARENTAL BILL of <\/em>RIGHTS<\/strong>
by T. Matthew Phillips, Attorney-at-Law<\/strong>
<\/em>U.S. Supreme Court Bar No. 317048<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

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A proposed BILL to ensure the CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS of PARENTS are honored and protected in the nation\u2019s FAMILY COURTS.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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  1. The 14th Amendment guarantees \u201cliberty,\u201d which includes the People\u2019s right to raise children; this fundamental right to parent<\/em> includes the right to care, custody, and control of one\u2019s children; so too, children enjoy an accompanying right, i.e<\/em>., the right to be parented<\/em> by their natural parents.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
  2. All parents are presumed fit. No court may restrict or terminate a parent\u2019s custodial rights unless there is first a fitness trial \u2014 where the state proves child abuse or neglect by clear and convincing evidence, i.e<\/em>., which can be objectively verified without resort to judicial discretion.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
  3. A properly noticed fitness trial must include: (i) notice to the accused parent concerning the factual allegations of child abuse or neglect, and (ii) an admonition that, if the accused parent is found unfit \u2014 based on clear and convincing evidence \u2014 the state may restrict or terminate that parent\u2019s custodial rights.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
  4. Fit parents are presumed to act in the best interests of their children; absent findings of unfitness, equal protection demands that two fit parents share equal and undivided custodial rights.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
  5. A child\u2019s best interests reside with fit parents; absent findings of unfitness, the state may not enter the private family realm. No court has legal authority, (\u201cjurisdiction\u201d), to determine a child\u2019s best interests \u2014 unless both parents are deemed unfit after a properly noticed fitness trial.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
  6. Unless there is actual harm to a child \u2014 meaning abuse or neglect as defined by black-letter law \u2014 a parent\u2019s bad behavior or felonious misconduct provides no legal basis to restrict or terminate custodial rights. No court may restrict or terminate custodial rights as punishment for misconduct against any person, including the other parent.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
  7. All orders restricting or terminating custodial rights must include strict scrutiny analyses, i.e<\/em>., was the custody order narrowly tailored to effectuate a compelling gov\u2019t interest?\u2014and, did the court employ the least-restrictive means of effectuating that interest?<\/li>\n\n\n\n
  8. The First Amendment guarantees a fundamental right to familial association \u2014 including the right to private speech with one\u2019s children. No court may impose time, place, or manner restrictions on a parent\u2019s right to free speech with a child, (e.g<\/em>., at supervised visits), unless that parent is found unfit.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
  9. All temporary custody orders must have expiration dates; temporary custody orders with no expiration dates are null and void. No temporary order restricting custodial rights shall remain in effect longer than 60 days, after which: (i) the order must expire, or (ii) a fitness trial must commence.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
  10. All parents in domestic proceedings are presumed innocent of criminal accusations unless or until the state, in a criminal proceeding, proves guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, pursuant to a criminal complaint, (\u201cindictment\u201d). No court may sua sponte<\/em> conclude that a parent committed a crime.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n\n\n\n
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    \"\"<\/figure>\n\n\n\n
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    E P I L O G U E<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

    Our proposed bill declares rights that are both fundamental and well-established by the U.S. Supreme Court and the federal circuits.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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    \u201cStare decisis is not dead; it just smells funny.\u201d
    <\/em>T. Matthew Phillips, Esq.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    T. Matthew Phillips is a California attorney, musicologist, art historian, astronomer, Orwellian scholar, registered cinephile, and part-time particle physicist. TMP advocates the unconditional abolition of vaccines, GMOs, chemtrails, Tidepods, Lysol, Windex, Febreeze, glyphosate, fluoride, and mainstream science. BIO: TMP has no college degree, but he did win a spelling contest in the seventh grade. TMP is principally known, in academic circles, for his masterly translation, into Latin, of “The Wizard of Oz,” which remains, even today, the standard Latin version of that work.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    Thoughts on \u201cThe Parental Bill of\u00a0Rights\u201d<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
      \n
    1. KATHRINE THOMAS <\/strong>
        \n
      1. \"\"T. Matthew Phillips, Esq.<\/a><\/strong>
      2. Theresa Sanzi <\/strong>
          \n
        1. \"\"T. Matthew Phillips, Esq.<\/a><\/strong>

          Thirteen SCOTUS Decisions on Parenting!by T. Matthew Phillips, Attorney-at-LawU.S. Supreme Court Bar No. 317048 Meyer vs. Nebraska \u2014 (1923) Meyer vs. Nebraska,262 U.S. 390 (1923):  One hundred years ago, SCOTUS first recognized the right to parent as a \u201cliberty\u201d interest … Continue reading →<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-29031","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-uncategorized"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"http:\/\/amicuscuria.com\/wordpress\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/29031","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"http:\/\/amicuscuria.com\/wordpress\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"http:\/\/amicuscuria.com\/wordpress\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/amicuscuria.com\/wordpress\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/amicuscuria.com\/wordpress\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=29031"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"http:\/\/amicuscuria.com\/wordpress\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/29031\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":29033,"href":"http:\/\/amicuscuria.com\/wordpress\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/29031\/revisions\/29033"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"http:\/\/amicuscuria.com\/wordpress\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=29031"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/amicuscuria.com\/wordpress\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=29031"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/amicuscuria.com\/wordpress\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=29031"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}