Case Information

07-3-00180-3 | SCOTT PAUL TURCHIN AND SHAWNIE ANN VEDDER
Case Number
07-3-00180-3

Court
Kitsap

File Date
02/07/2007

Case Type
MSC3 Miscellaneous – Domestic

Case Status
Completed/Re-Completed

Party

Respondent
VEDDER, SHAWNIE ANN

---

Petitioner
TURCHIN, SCOTT PAUL

---

Minor (Participant)
VEDDER, MILDRED ANN

---

Involved Party (Participant)
STATE OF WASHINGTON

Active Attorneys
Lead AttorneyANDREWS, JENNIFER DURCAN

Retained

---

---

Conversion (Participant)
VEDDER, SHAWNIE

Active Attorneys
Pro Se

---

Events and Hearings

• 02/07/2007 Case Resolution Uncontested Resolution
• 1 02/07/2007 Copy View Document Copy Comment
  1: COPY DISPOSITIONAL DOCUMENTS FROM; 97 5 00460 1;
• 02/07/2007 Filing Fee Not Paid Comment
  FILING FEE NOT PAID; COUNSEL FOR PETITIONER NOTIFIED; 02/08/2007;
• 2 02/07/2007 Summons and Petition for Modification View Document Summons and Petition for Modification Comment
  2: SUMMONS & PETITION FOR MODIFICATION;
• 3 02/07/2007 Motion and Affidavit Declaration View Document Motion and Affidavit Declaration Comment
  3: MOTION AND AFFIDAVIT/DECLARATION; FOR ADEQUATE CAUSE;
• 4 02/07/2007 Notice of Hearing View Document NOTICE OF HEARING Comment
  4: NOTICE OF HEARING; 02-16-2007; NOTED FOR WRONG CALENDAR/COUNSEL; NOTIFIED 02/08/2007 WILL RENOTE;
• 02/12/2007 Filing Fee Received Comment
  FILING FEE RECEIVED;
• 5 02/12/2007 Notice of Hearing View Document Notice of HearingComment
  5: NOTICE OF HEARING AMENDED; 02-26-2007PC; ADEQUATE CAUSE;
• 6 02/12/2007 Declaration of Mailing View Document DECLARATION OF MAILINGComment
  6: DECLARATION OF MAILING;
• 7 02/15/2007 Affidavit Declaration Certificate Confirmation of Service View Document Affidavit Declaration Certificate Confirmation of ServiceComment
  7: AFFIDAVIT/DCLR/CERT OF SERVICE;
• 02/16/2007 Cancelled/Rescheduled Hearing/Trial/Motion (conversion) Hearing Time
  08:00 AM Comment
  4: NOTICE OF HEARING; 02-16-2007; NOTED FOR WRONG CALENDAR/COUNSEL; NOTIFIED 02/08/2007 WILL RENOTE;
• 02/26/2007 Paternity Misc Matters 9:00 AM Hearing Time
  8:00 AM Comment
  ADEQUATE CAUSE
• 8 02/26/2007 Request for Continuance View Document REQUEST FOR CONTINUANCE Comment
  8: REQUEST FOR CONTINUANCE; 03-19-2007PC; ADEQUATE CAUSE;
• 9 02/26/2007 Motion Hearing View Document MOTION HEARING Comment
  9: MOTION HEARING; MATTER CONTINUED BY AGREEMENT; COMMISSIONER RICHARD ADAMSON; COURT REPORTER NICKIE DRURY;
• 10 03/13/2007 Appearance Pro Se View Document APPEARANCE PRO SEComment
  10: APPEARANCE PRO SE; RESPONDENT: VEDDER, SHAWNIE ANN;
• 11 03/13/2007 Response View Document ResponseComment
  11: RESPONSE TO MODIFICATION PETITION;
• 12 03/13/2007 Declaration Affidavit View Document Declaration AffidavitComment
  12: DECLARATION OF SHAWNIE VEDDER;
• 13 03/13/2007 Certificate of Mailing View Document CERTIFICATE OF MAILINGComment
  13: CERTIFICATE OF MAILING;
• 03/19/2007 Paternity Misc Matters 9:00 AM Hearing Time
  8:00 AM Comment
  ADEQUATE CAUSE
• 14 03/19/2007 Settlement Conference Setting View Document SETTLEMENT CONFERENCE SETTING Comment
  14: SETTLEMENT CONFERENCE SETTING; 05 14 2007 1:30PM;
• 15 03/19/2007 Motion Hearing View Document MOTION HEARINGComment
  15: MOTION HEARING; ORDER SIGNED AS PRESENTED; COMMISSIONER RICHARD ADAMSON; COURT REPORTER JAMI JACOBSEN;
• 16 03/19/2007 Order Re Adequate Cause Granted View Document Order Re Adequate Cause GrantedComment
  16: ORDER RE ADEQUATE CAUSE – GRANTED; COMMISSIONER RICHARD ADAMSON;
• 04/12/2007 Non Fee Comment
  NON FEE;
• 04/12/2007 ADM05 Comment
  STATE CASE – MODIFICATION;
• 17 04/12/2007 Summons and Petition for Modification View Document Summons and Petition for ModificationComment
  17: SUMMONS & PETITION FOR MODIFICATION;
• 18 04/12/2007 Notice Re Dependent of a Person in Military Service View Document Notice Re Dependent of a Person in Military Service Comment
  18: NT RE: DEPENDENT OF MILITARY PERSON;
• 19 04/12/2007 Sealed Financial Source Documents View Document Sealed Financial Source Documents Comment
  19: SEALED FINANCIAL DOCUMENT(S); RESPONDENT: VEDDER, SHAWNIE ANN;
• 20 04/12/2007 Sealed Financial Source Documents View Document Sealed Financial Source Documents Comment
  20: SEALED FINANCIAL DOCUMENT(S); PETITIONER: TURCHIN, SCOTT PAUL;
• 21 04/12/2007 Child Support Worksheet View Document Child Support Worksheet Comment
  21: CHILD SUPPORT WORKSHEET PROPOSED; BY SHAWNIE ANN VEDDER;
• 22 04/12/2007 Financial Declaration View Document Financial Declaration Comment
  22: FINANCIAL DECLARATION SHAWNIE ANN; VEDDER;
• 23 04/17/2007 Return of Service View Document RETURN OF SERVICE Comment
  23: RETURN OF SERVICE;
• 24 04/18/2007 Return of Service View Document RETURN OF SERVICE Comment
  24: RETURN OF SERVICE;
• 25 04/26/2007 Sealed Financial Source Documents View Document Sealed Financial Source Documents Comment
  25: SEALED FINANCIAL DOCUMENT(S);
• 26 04/26/2007 Child Support Worksheet View Document Child Support Worksheet Comment
  26: CHILD SUPPORT WORKSHEET SUBMITTED; BY SHAWNIE ANN VEDDER;
• 27 04/26/2007 Acceptance of Service View Document ACCEPTANCE OF SERVICE Comment
  27: ACCEPTANCE OF SERVICE;
• 04/26/2007 Appearance Pro Se Comment
  APPEARANCE PRO SE; RESPONDENT: VEDDER, SHAWNIE ANN;
• 28 04/26/2007 Financial Declaration View Document FINANCIAL DECLARATION Comment
  28: FINANCIAL DECLARATION;
• 29 05/15/2007 Settlement Conference Setting View Document SETTLEMENT CONFERENCE SETTING Comment
  29: SETTLEMENT CONFERENCE SETTING; 07 24 2007 @ 1:30PM; JUDGE SALLY F. OLSEN, DEPT 8;
• 30 06/04/2007 Letter View Document Letter Comment
  30: LETTER DATED 05/23/07 SUBMITTED BY; SCOTT PAUL TURCHIN;
• 31 06/04/2007 Child Support Worksheet View Document Child Support WorksheetComment
  31: CHILD SUPPORT WORKSHEET REVISED; STATES PROPOSED;
• 32 06/04/2007 Note for Motion Docket View Document NOTE FOR MOTION DOCKET Comment
  32: NOTE FOR MOTION DOCKET; 07-02-2007PC; HEARING RE SUPPORT MODIFICATION;
• 33 06/04/2007 Acceptance of Service View Document ACCEPTANCE OF SERVICE Comment
  33: ACCEPTANCE OF SERVICE;
• 06/04/2007 Appearance Pro Se Comment
  APPEARANCE PRO SE; RESPONDENT: VEDDER, SHAWNIE ANN;
• 34 06/14/2007 Child Support Worksheet View Document Child Support Worksheet Comment
  34: CHILD SUPPORT WORKSHEET REVISED; STATES PROPOSED;
• 35 06/21/2007 Notice of Absence Unavailability View Document Notice of Absence Unavailability Comment
  35: NOTICE OF ABSENCE/UNAVAILABILITY; GOODELL, DANIEL LEE;
• 36 06/21/2007 Letter View Document Letter Comment
  36: LETTER FROM SHAWNIE ANN VEDDER;
• 37 06/21/2007 Sealed Financial Source Documents View Document Sealed Financial Source Documents Comment
  37: SEALED FINANCIAL DOCUMENT(S);
• 07/02/2007 Paternity Misc Matters 9:00 AM Hearing Time
  8:00 AM Comment
  HEARING RE SUPPORT MODIFICATION
• 38 07/02/2007 Modification Hearing View Document MODIFICATION HEARING Comment
  38: MODIFICATION HEARING; ORDER SIGNED AS PRESENTED; COMMISSIONER RICHARD ADAMSON; COURT REPORTER ANDREA EVANS;
• 39 07/02/2007 Order for Support View Document ORDER FOR SUPPORT Comment
  39: ORDER FOR SUPPORT;
• 07/02/2007 Child Support Worksheet Comment
  CHILD SUPPORT WORKSHEET;
• 40 07/02/2007 Order on Modification View Document ORDER ON MODIFICATION Comment
  40: ORDER ON MODIFICATION; COMMISSIONER RICHARD ADAMSON;
• 07/19/2007 Registry Referral Letter Comment
  REGISTRY REFERRAL LETTER;
• 41 09/06/2007 Note for Motion Docket View Document NOTE FOR MOTION DOCKET Comment
  41: NOTE FOR MOTION DOCKET; 09-28-2007JR; PRESENTATION OF FINAL ORDERS;
• 09/28/2007 JR Hearing Time
  8:00 AM Comment
  PRESENTATION OF FINAL ORDERS
• 42 09/28/2007 Motion Hearing View Document MOTION HEARING Comment
  42: MOTION HEARING; ENTRY OF ORDER; JUDGE JAY B ROOF, DEPT 5; COURT REPORTER ANDREA EVANS;
• 43 09/28/2007 Residential Time Summary Report View Document RESIDENTIAL TIME SUMMARY REPORT Comment
  43: RESIDENTIAL TIME SUMMARY REPORT;
• 44 09/28/2007 Order on Modification View Document ORDER ON MODIFICATION Comment
  44: ORDER ON MODIFICATION;
• 45 09/28/2007 Parenting Plan Final Order View Document Parenting Plan Final Order Comment
  45: PARENTING PLAN (FINAL ORDER); JUDGE JAY B ROOF, DEPT 5;
• 46 09/28/2007 Declaration of Mailing View Document DECLARATION OF MAILING Comment
  46: DECLARATION OF MAILING;
• 10/04/2007 Registry Referral Letter Comment
  REGISTRY REFERRAL LETTER;
• 47 08/07/2008 Notice of Intent to Withdraw View Document NOTICE OF INTENT TO WITHDRAW Comment
  47: NOTICE OF INTENT TO WITHDRAW;
• 48 03/07/2013 Satisfaction of Judgment View Document SATISFACTION OF JUDGMENT Comment
  48: SATISFACTION OF JUDGMENT;

Cupcake Sued for DVPO

Case Information

13-2-00281-1 | Scott Turchin on behalf of Mildred Vedder vs Shawnie Vedder
Case Number
13-2-00281-1

Court
Mason

File Date
05/08/2013

Case Type
DVP Domestic Violence

Case Status
Completed/Re-Completed

Party

Respondent (WIP)
VEDDER, SHAWNIE ANN

DOB
XX/XX/1967

Active Attorneys
Lead AttorneyBardwil, Mark Edward

Retained

---

Petitioner (WIP)
TURCHIN, SCOTT PAUL

DOB
XX/XX/1965

---

Minor (WIP)
VEDDER, MILDRED ANN

DOB
XX/XX/1996

Events and Hearings

• 05/08/2013 Confidential Information Form Comment
  -: CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION FORM;
• 05/08/2013 Declaration Affidavit Comment
  -: DECLARATION RE FAX SIGNATURE;
• 1 05/08/2013 Petition for Order for Protection View Document PET ORD FOR PROTECTION Comment
  1: PET ORD FOR PROTECTION;
• 05/08/2013 Declaration Affidavit Comment
  -: DECLARATION RE FAX SIGNATURE;
• 2 05/08/2013 Declaration Affidavit View Document DECLARATION OF SCOTT TURCHIN Comment
  2: DECLARATION OF SCOTT TURCHIN;
• 05/08/2013 Declaration Affidavit Comment
  -: DECLARATION RE FAX SIGNATURE;
• 3 05/08/2013 Declaration Affidavit View Document DECLARATION OF DAVID VEDDER Comment
  3: DECLARATION OF DAVID VEDDER;
• 05/08/2013 Declaration Affidavit Comment
  -: DECLARATION RE FAX SIGNATURE;
• 4 05/08/2013 Sealed Confidential Reports Cover Sheet View Document SEALED CONFIDENTIAL RPTS CVR SHEET Comment
  4: SEALED CONFIDENTIAL RPTS CVR SHEET; -CPS SUMMARY REPORT;
• 5 05/08/2013 Temporary Order for Protection View Document TEMP ORD FOR PROTECTION Comment
  5: TEMP ORD FOR PROTECTION; 05-22-2013MC; PROTECTION ORDER @ 1:30 PM;
• 05/08/2013 Ex Parte Action With Order Comment
  -: EX-PARTE ACTION WITH ORDER; JUDGE AMBER L. FINLAY;
• 6 05/10/2013 Return of Service View Document RETURN OF SERVICE Comment
  6: RETURN OF SERVICE;
• 05/22/2013 MC Domestic/Probate – Motion Calendar Hearing Time
  8:00 AM Comment
  PROTECTION ORDER @ 1:30 PM
• 7 05/22/2013 Order Reissuing Temporary Protection Order View Document ORD REISSUING TEMP PROTECTION ORDER Comment
  7: ORD REISSUING TEMP PROTECTION ORDER; 06-05-2013MC; PROTECTION ORDER @ 1:30;
• 8 05/22/2013 Motion Hearing View Document MOTION HEARING Comment
  8: MOTION HEARING;
• 9 05/22/2013 Notice of Appearance View Document NOTICE OF APPEARANCE Comment
  9: NOTICE OF APPEARANCE;
• 06/05/2013 MC Domestic/Probate – Motion Calendar Hearing Time
  8:00 AM Comment
  PROTECTION ORDER @ 1:30
• 06/05/2013 Case Resolution Closed by Court Order After a Hearing
• 10 06/05/2013 Order Modifying Terminating Terms of Protective Order View Document ORD MOD_TRM TERMS OF PROT ORD Comment
  10: ORD MOD/TRM TERMS OF PROT ORD;
• 11 06/05/2013 Motion Hearing View Document MOTION HEARING Comment
  11: MOTION HEARING;

Case Information

13-3-00176-1 | SCOTT TURCHIN VS SHAWNIE VEDDER

Case Number
13-3-00176-1

Court
Mason

File Date
06/05/2013

Case Type
MOD3 Domestic Modification

Case Status
Completed/Re-Completed

Party

Respondent (WIP)
VEDDER, SHAWNIE ANN

DOB
XX/XX/1967

Petitioner (WIP)
TURCHIN, SCOTT PAUL

DOB
XX/XX/1965

Minor (WIP)
VEDDER, MILDRED ANN

DOB
XX/XX/1996

Events and Hearings

• 06/05/2013 Filing Fee Received Comment
  -: FILING FEE RECEIVED; GOODELL, DANIEL LEE;
• 06/05/2013 Case Information Cover Sheet Comment
  -: CASE INFORMATION COVER SHEET;
• 06/05/2013 Confidential Information Form Comment
  -: CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION FORM;
• 1 06/05/2013 Summons View Document SUMMONS Comment
  1: SUMMONS;
• 2 06/05/2013 Petition Motion to Modify View Document PETITION_MOTION TO MODIFY Comment
  2: PETITION/MOTION TO MODIFY;
• 3 06/05/2013 Notice of Appearance View Document NOTICE OF APPEARANCE Comment
  3: NOTICE OF APPEARANCE; GOODELL, DANIEL LEE;
• 4 06/05/2013 Acceptance of Service View Document ACCEPTANCE OF SERVICE Comment
  4: ACCEPTANCE OF SERVICE;
• 5 06/05/2013 Parenting Plan Temporary View Document PARENTING PLAN – TEMPORARY Comment
  5: PARENTING PLAN – TEMPORARY;
• 06/05/2013 Ex Parte Action With Order Comment
  -: EX-PARTE ACTION WITH ORDER; COMM. ROBERT D. SAUERLENDER;
• 6 06/05/2013 Child Support Worksheet View Document CHILD SUPPORT WORKSHEET Comment
  6: CHILD SUPPORT WORKSHEET;
• 06/05/2013 Ex Parte Action With Order Comment
  -: EX-PARTE ACTION WITH ORDER; COMM. ROBERT D. SAUERLENDER;
• 7 06/05/2013 Temporary Order of Child Support View Document TEMP ORDER OF CHILD SUPPORT Comment
  7: TEMP ORDER OF CHILD SUPPORT;
• 06/05/2013 Ex Parte Action With Order Comment
  -: EX-PARTE ACTION WITH ORDER; COMM. ROBERT D. SAUERLENDER;
• 8 06/05/2013 Temporary Order View Document TEMPORARY ORDER Comment
  8: TEMPORARY ORDER; 08-28-2013MC; REVIEW HEARING @ 9; CONFIRMED/GOODELL/8-26 GB;
• 06/05/2013 Ex Parte Action With Order Comment
  -: EX-PARTE ACTION WITH ORDER; COMM. ROBERT D. SAUERLENDER;
• 9 07/15/2013 Notice Withdraw and Substitution of Counsel View Document NOTICE WITHDRAW & SUBSTITUT COUNSEL Comment
  9: NOTICE WITHDRAW & SUBSTITUT COUNSEL; GOODELL, DANIEL LEE;
• 08/28/2013 MC Domestic/Probate – Motion Calendar Hearing Time
  8:00 AM Comment
  REVIEW HEARING @ 9 CONFIRMED/GOODELL/8-26 GB
• 08/28/2013 Case Resolution Uncontested Resolution
• 10 08/28/2013 Order on Modification View Document ORDER ON MODIFICATION Comment
  10: ORDER ON MODIFICATION;
• 11 08/28/2013 Order for Support View Document ORDER FOR SUPPORT Comment
  11: ORDER FOR SUPPORT;
• 12 08/28/2013 Parenting Plan Final Order View Document PARENTING PLAN (FINAL ORDER) Comment
  12: PARENTING PLAN (FINAL ORDER);
• 13 08/28/2013 Child Support Worksheet View Document CHILD SUPPORT WORKSHEET Comment
  13: CHILD SUPPORT WORKSHEET;
• 14 08/28/2013 Order View Document ORDER RE_ DATA BASE SEARCH Comment
  14: ORDER RE: DATA BASE SEARCH;
• 15 08/28/2013 Residential Time Summary Report View Document RESIDENTIAL TIME SUMMARY REPORT Comment
  15: RESIDENTIAL TIME SUMMARY REPORT;
• 16 08/28/2013 Motion Hearing View Document MOTION HEARING Comment
  16: MOTION HEARING;
• 17 10/28/2013 Notice of Intent to Withdraw View Document NOTICE OF INTENT TO WITHDRAW Comment
  17: NOTICE OF INTENT TO WITHDRAW;
• 18 11/19/2013 Notice of Intent to Withdraw View Document NOTICE OF INTENT TO WITHDRAW Comment
  18: NOTICE OF INTENT TO WITHDRAW;

High Court rules convicted sex offender can become WA State lawyer

Nov. 4, 2022 at 9:00 am Updated Nov. 7, 2022 at 4:00 pm

By GENE JOHNSONThe Associated Press

SEATTLE (AP) — A divided Washington Supreme Court on Thursday approved a registered sex offender’s application to become an attorney in the state — though the man says he’s not sure he’ll wind up practicing law after all.

Zachary Leroy Stevens, 35, has been living in Arizona, where he attended law school and worked for a lawyer who represents American Indian tribes. He grew up in Utah, where he was convicted of voyeurism after sending child pornography to an undercover detective in 2006 at age 19 and where several years later he was arrested for drunken driving while on probation.

In a 5-4 decision, the court noted his relative youth at the time of his offenses, that he wasn’t much older than the people whose images he shared, and said he had since demonstrated the “good moral character” necessary to be allowed to practice law. Stevens was previously refused admission to the Arizona bar but said he would move to Washington state, where his wife had connections, if his application there was approved.

“Like all of us, Stevens is more than the sum of the worst moments of his life,” Justice Mary Yu wrote for the majority. “As an adult, he has abstained from engaging in any unlawful conduct since 2013. In that time, he has graduated from college and law school, he has been steadily employed, and he has developed a supportive network of friends and family.”

The dissenting justices, led by Justice Barbara Madsen, said they were concerned that Stevens had not completed his legal obligations — he must continue to register as a sex offender until 2024 at least; that he had not provided a current mental health evaluation; and that the Arizona bar had rejected his application, a factor that Washington should respect, they said.

“The fact that Stevens must register as a sex offender until he is eligible to petition for remission is particularly concerning, especially because one of this court’s key responsibilities is to guard the public and its confidence in the judicial system,” Madsen wrote.

That said, she suggested her analysis might be different once Stevens submitted a current evaluation and was no longer required to register as a sex offender. Under Utah law, sex offenders can petition to have their registration requirements canceled after 10 years.

Stevens applied to become a lawyer in Washington in 2019, after Arizona rejected his application. A Washington State Bar Association committee reviewed his petition and rejected it 6-5. He appealed to the Supreme Court.

In a phone interview Thursday night, he said he cried when he read the decision.

“I’ve been trying to get admitted to the practice of law for longer than I attended law school,” he said.

Stevens said he is now working for the multinational conglomerate Honeywell, where he works on subcontracting for government projects. His plans to move to Washington state have been disrupted because he and his wife have split up, he said.

As for legal work, he noted that he could stay in Phoenix and represent tribes as an attorney on gaming and water rights issues, because he wouldn’t need to be a member of the Arizona bar to do so. Or he could move to Washington state anyway, since his brother recently moved to Portland, Oregon.

(Yet another example of why Thurston Family Court sux)

Case Information

19-2-30942-34 | JENNIFER LORRAINE COMO vs JAMES WARREN FOWLER, Jr
Case Number
19-2-30942-34

Court
Thurston

File Date
12/18/2019

Case Type
DVP Domestic Violence

Case Status
Completed/Re-Completed

Party

Respondent (WIP)
FOWLER, JAMES WARREN, Jr

DOB
XX/XX/1970

Active Attorneys
Lead AttorneyWAGNER, FORREST LEE

Retained

---

---

Petitioner (WIP)
COMO, JENNIFER LORRAINE

DOB
XX/XX/1976

Active Attorneys
Pro Se

---

---

Minor (WIP)
FOWLER-COMO, JORDAN RAIN

DOB
XX/XX/2012

Events and Hearings

• 12/18/2019 Confidential Information Form
• 1 12/18/2019 Petition for Order for Protection View Document Petition for Order for Protection
• 2 12/18/2019 Appearance Pro Se View Document Appearance Pro Se
• 3 12/18/2019 Motion Hearing View Document Motion Hearing
• 4 12/18/2019 Temporary Order for Protection View Document Temporary Order for ProtectionComment
  Protection Order
• 5 12/23/2019 Response View Document ResponseComment
  James Fowler JR
• 6 12/24/2019 Sheriffs Return on Service View Document Sheriffs Return on Service
• 12/31/2019 Protection Order Judicial Officer
  Zinn, Rebekah Hearing Time
  9:00 AM Comment
  PROTECTION ORDER
• 7 12/31/2019 Order Reissuing Temporary Protection Order View Document Order Reissuing Temporary Protection Order Comment
  Protection Order-1
• 8 12/31/2019 Motion Hearing View Document Motion Hearing
• 9 01/21/2020 Declaration Affidavit View Document Declaration Affidavit Comment
  Jay Hawn
• 10 01/21/2020 Declaration Affidavit View Document Declaration Affidavit Comment
  Rachel Dreon
• 11 01/21/2020 Declaration Affidavit View Document Declaration Affidavit Comment
  Timothy Miller
• 12 /21/2020 Declaration Affidavit View Document Declaration Affidavit Comment
  Kenneth Lamb
• 13 01/21/2020 Declaration Affidavit View Document Declaration Affidavit Comment
  Michelle Thomas
• 14 01/21/2020 Declaration Affidavit View Document Declaration Affidavit Comment
  Eve Kirk-Monti
• 15 01/21/2020 Declaration Affidavit View Document Declaration Affidavit Comment
  Lance Denison
• 16 01/21/2020 Declaration Affidavit View Document Declaration Affidavit Comment
  Kami Denison
• 17 01/21/2020 Declaration Affidavit View Document Declaration Affidavit Comment
  Brian Osche
• 18 01/21/2020 Declaration Affidavit View Document Declaration Affidavit Comment
  Jennifer Trahan
• 19 01/21/2020 Declaration Affidavit View Document Declaration Affidavit Comment
  Ryan Estreito
• 20 01/21/2020 Declaration Affidavit View Document Declaration Affidavit Comment
  Jeff Grant
• 21 01/21/2020 Declaration Affidavit View Document Declaration Affidavit Comment
  Ronald Holmes
• 22 01/21/2020 Declaration Affidavit View Document Declaration Affidavit Comment
  Suzanne Younker
• 23 01/21/2020 Declaration Affidavit View Document Declaration Affidavit Comment
  Shajan Kanajaril
• 24 01/21/2020 Declaration Affidavit View Document Declaration Affidavit Comment
  Brandy Burbidge
• 25 01/21/2020 Declaration Affidavit View Document Declaration Affidavit Comment
  Matthew Phillips
• 26 01/21/2020 Declaration Affidavit View Document Declaration Affidavit Comment
  James Peterson
• 27 01/21/2020 Declaration Affidavit View Document Declaration Affidavit Comment
  Autum Peterson
• 28 01/21/2020 Declaration Affidavit View Document Declaration Affidavit Comment
  Dennis Neal
• 29 01/21/2020 Declaration Affidavit View Document Declaration Affidavit Comment
  William Mummey
• 30 01/21/2020 Declaration Affidavit View Document Declaration Affidavit Comment
  Robert Alexander
• 31 01/21/2020 Declaration Affidavit View Document Declaration Affidavit Comment
  James Fowler
• 32 03/25/2020 Order Reissuing Temporary Protection Order View Document Order Reissuing Temporary Protection Order Comment
  Protection Order-1/Motion to Modify
• 03/25/2020 Ex Parte Action With Order
• 33 03/25/2020 Petition Motion to Modify View Document Petition Motion to Modify
• 34 03/25/2020 Motion Hearing View Document Motion Hearing
• 35 03/25/2020 Order of Continuance View Document Order of ContinuanceComment
  Hearing Noted-Sub #33
• 03/27/2020 Protection Order Judicial Officer
  Zinn, Rebekah Hearing Time
  11:00 AM Cancel Reason
  Continuance Comment
  PROTECTION ORDER-1
• 36 04/03/2020 Sheriffs Return on Service View Document Sheriffs Return on Service
• 37 05/18/2020 Notice of Hearing View Document Notice of Hearing Comment
  Hearing Noted Sub #33
• 05/22/2020 Protection Order Judicial Officer
  Zinn, Rebekah Hearing Time
  11:00 AM Comment
  PROTECTION ORDER-1/Motion to Modify
• 38 05/22/2020 Order for Protection View Document Order for Protection
• 05/22/2020 Case Resolution Closed by Court Order After a Hearing
• 39 05/22/2020 Motion Hearing View Document Motion Hearing
• 40 11/23/2020 Notice of Appearance View Document Notice of Appearance
• 41 11/23/2020 Proposed Order Findings View Document Proposed Order FindingsComment
  Show Cause
• 42 11/23/2020 Motion for Order to Show Cause View Document Motion for Order to Show Cause
• 43 11/23/2020 Declaration Affidavit View Document Declaration Affidavit Comment
  of Robert Alexander
• 44 11/23/2020 Transcript of Proceedings View Document Transcript of Proceedings Comment
  of March 25, 2020
• 45 11/23/2020 Transcript of Proceedings View Document Transcript of Proceedings Comment
  of December 31, 2019
• 46 11/23/2020 Transcript of Proceedings View Document Transcript of Proceedings Comment
  of May 22, 2020
• 47 11/23/2020 Report View Document Report Comment
  of School Attendance and Discipline Records
• 11/23/2020 Sealed Personal Health Care Records Cover Sheet
• 48 11/23/2020 Letter View Document Letter Comment
  from Dispute Resolution Center
• 49 11/23/2020 Notice View Document Notice Comment
  of IEP Meeting from School
• 50 11/23/2020 Report View Document Report Comment
  of School Records
• 51 11/23/2020 Certificate View Document Certificate
  of Completion for Respondent
• 52 11/23/2020 Report View Document Report Comment
  of Police
• 53 11/23/2020 Notice of Hearing View Document Notice of Hearing Comment
  Motion to Show Cause RE Vacation
• 11/24/2020 Motion Hearing Judicial Officer
  Kortokrax, Nathan L. Hearing Time
  4:00 PM Comment
  Motion to Show Cause RE Vacation
• 54 11/24/2020 Order to Show Cause View Document Order to Show Cause Comment
  Motion to Vacate
• 55 11/24/2020 Motion Hearing View Document Motion Hearing
• 56 12/07/2020 Affidavit Declaration Certificate Confirmation of Service View Document Affidavit Declaration Certificate Confirmation of Service
• 12/14/2020 Motion Hearing Judicial Officer
  Zinn, Rebekah Hearing Time
  2:00 PM Comment
  MOTION TO VACATE
• 57 12/14/2020 Order for Hearing View Document Order for Hearing Comment
  Motion to Vacate
• 58 12/14/2020 Motion Hearing View Document Motion Hearing
• 01/04/2021 Motion Hearing Judicial Officer
  Zinn, Rebekah Hearing Time
  2:00 PM Comment
  MOTION TO VACATE
• 59 01/04/2021 Order Granting Rsps Motion to Modify Term Order over 2 yrs View Document Order Granting Rsps Motion to Modify Term Order over 2 yrs
• 60 01/04/2021 Motion Hearing View Document Motion Hearing
• 61 04/05/2022 Order Setting View Document Order Setting
• 04/19/2022 Default Judicial Officer
  Rawnsley, Patrick W Hearing Time
  10:30 AM
• 62 04/19/2022 Motion Hearing View Document Motion Hearing

House Passes Goodman Bill to Add “Coercive Control” to Definition of Domestic Violence

Welcome to the cesspool of Washington jurisprudence and its purveyors.

February 9, 2022

OLYMPIA – Legislation to add “coercive control” to the definition of domestic violence passed the Washington State House of Representatives yesterday. House Bill 1901, sponsored by Rep. Roger Goodman (D-Kirkland) passed with a bipartisan vote of 70-26. The bill further reforms Washington’s protection order system, which was thoroughly revamped last year with the passage of House Bill 1320, also sponsored by Goodman. HB 1320 made permanent the practices established during the pandemic to allow for survivors to file petitions online, electronic service of protection orders, and video or telephone hearings.  

“Any major reform inevitably needs refinement and clarification, so this bill includes several practical changes to make the protection order process even more workable, but we are also responding to the concerns from survivors, judges, and prosecutors about inadequate protection from coercive control,” said Goodman. “I strongly believe that we should include coercive control in the law to give all survivors the tools and knowledge they need to protect themselves.” 

Coercive control is an abuser’s pattern of behavior that causes a victim to suffer physical, emotional, or psychological harm and is used by the abuser to control the victim. Examples of coercive control include intimidation or threats of harm against the victim, children, family members, or pets; destroying or threatening to damage property; abusing technology through cyberstalking, surveillance, distributing intimate images and commandeering social media accounts; brandishing firearms to intimidate; financial exploitation; abusive litigation; and several other forms of harassment. Research shows that coercive control is a widespread form of domestic violence that too often goes unrecognized.  

[Yeah, invisible even. They forgot to include felony theft of a peanut butter sandwich with a jelly prior. Holding your breath until you turn blue will now be subject to prosecution as a form of DV. After all, it may cause mom emotional stress or dad to smoke more. Although it appears largely intended to emasculate men via government fiat, women are some of the worst offenders of “coercive control” prohibitions as defined herein. It describes precisely the means (cyberstalking, abusive litigation, financial exploitation, perjury, theft of credit card data 24/7, cell phone tracking, false police reports, etc.) Kathryn Stoker and her husband, Hans, to steal Selena Smith’s 3 small children from ma foreign jurisdiction without proper standing, due process, or jurisdiction.]

“It’s time for our culture and laws to catch up with the research,” said Goodman. “Domestic abuse is not just physical, but also emotional and psychological. With this important change in the law, survivors will have greater protection from abusers whose pattern of coercive control can cause even more trauma than physical harm. It is well past time that our laws accounts for this completely unacceptable and dangerous behavior.” 

The bill now heads to the Senate for consideration.  

[This kind of crap, like tax on water in grocery stores, NEVER shows up on a ballot because the voters have more common sense than that. This bill was yet another brick in the wall of oppression and government excess. It errs in being excessively vague and overly broad. When everything becomes DV, nothing is DV.]

BIBLIOGRAPHY MATERIALS PROMOTING “COERCIVE CONTROL” AS DV

(Histrionics 101)

Litigation Abuse – YWCA Vancouver 2010

Court Related Abuse & Harassment

King County Prosecutor’s Domestic Violence Manual -2017-

When Coercive Control Continues to Harm Children: Post Separation Fathering, Stalking, & Domestic Violence

Nevada 3/2022 New Legislation Aims To Uncover The Link Between Domestic Abuse And Brain Damage

Women are Routinely Discredited 8/202. How courts fail mothers and children who have survived abuse. 8/2021

Joan Meier & Danielle Pollack 3/2021 Allenv Farrow: Child Sexual Abuse is the Final Frontier

Domestic Violence & Child Murder Red Flags

My ex Used the Justice System as a form of coercive control –

The law should not aide the abuse of women 7/2021

Child Abuse & Custody in Family Court-May 2021

DV LEAP WEBSITE

Best Practices for Taking Appeals in Custody & Abuse Cases

Rates at which Accused & Adjudicated Batterers Receive Sole Custody-DC DV Leap 2013

Fighting for Your Rights to Busk/Perform

Amplification Ethics

by Stephen H. Baird

1982-2021 by Stephen Baird

I wrote the editorials enclosed below for the Street Performers’ Newsletter in 1982 Court decisions have been inconsistent, but are growing in supporting the right to use amplification.  The battle rages on repeatedly in state and federal courts including

these newer cases Turley vs NYC was favorably decided in May 1997, including a substantial financial settlement Turley v. NYC 988 F.Supp, 667 & 675 (1997). See US 2nd Cir Appeal 98-7114 (1999) web site decision: http://www.tourolaw.edu/2ndCircuit/January99/98-71141.html. 

A text version of the Turley decision is available on this site by clickinghere

Ocean City Boardwalk 2013 amplification case: Hassay v. Mayor, 955 F.Supp.2d 505 (2013)“The violinist, William Hassay, asserted that the restriction prevented him from communicating any emotion with his music, and therefore he had stopped playing on the boardwalk. Id. at 512. During a hearing on the plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction, two of the Plaintiffs in this case, Mark Chase and Alex Young, testified that they had also been warned and/or cited for violating the restriction. Id. at 513-14. In addition, an expert provided unrebutted testimony that on the boardwalk, a musician needed to play at a level of at least seventy decibels for the music to be intelligible to an audience fifteen feet away. Id. at 524. At seventy decibels, however, the music would also be “easily audible” at a distance of thirty feet and accordingly violate the restriction. Id.

Applying intermediate scrutiny[10] Judge Hollander held that the plaintiff had established a likelihood of success on the merits with respect to his First Amendment claim. Specifically, the restriction was not narrowly tailored to prevent excessive noise and did not leave open ample alternative channels for communication given that, “[i]n effect, the 30-Foot Audibility Restriction [wa]s tantamount to a complete ban on the use of musical instruments and amplified sound on the boardwalk.” Id. at 524. Accordingly, this Court entered a preliminary injunction against the enforcement of the restriction as applied to the boardwalk. Id. at 527. Ultimately, the parties jointly requested that the injunction be made permanent. Hassay, 955 F.Supp.2d 505 at ECF No. 43″.

Venice Beach Boardwalk musician legal battle – US District Judge Pregerson blocks Venice boardwalk lottery permit system and amplification ban in Dowd and all vs City of Los Angles – October 21, 2010 (Dowd v. City of Los Angeles, No. CV 09-06731 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 21, 2010)

• District Court Injunction opinion: vbbc.files.wordpress.com/2010/10/venice-dowd-injunction.doc
• Los Angels Times article: http://articles.latimes.com/2010/oct/27/local/la-me-venice-vendors-20101027

“Other courts have struck down amplified sound restrictions  less sweeping than the total ban on amplified sound on the Venice  Boardwalk. See, e.g., Deegan v. City of Ithaca, 444 F.3d 135 (2d  Cir. 2006) (holding noise regulation as applied to prohibit any  sound that could be heard 25 feet from its source in downtown  pedestrian mall was not narrowly tailored); Doe, 968 F.2d at 89  (holding regulation prohibiting operating an audio device in a manner exceeding 60 decibels at 50 feet was not narrowly tailored  as applied to Lafayette Park because “[b]y no reasonable measure  does Lafayette Park display the characteristics of a setting in  which the government may lay claim to a legitimate interest in  maintaining tranquility”); Beckerman v. City of Tupelo, Miss.,  664 F.2d 502, 516 (5th Cir. 1981) (holding ban on amplified sound  in residential zones overbroad because “the ordinance extends its  total and non-discretionary prohibition to areas which have not  been shown to be incompatible with sound equipment”); Reeves v.  McConn, 631 F.2d 377, 384 (5th Cir. 1980) (holding amplified sound  ban in downtown business district was not narrowly tailored because “there is probably no more appropriate place for reasonably amplified free speech than the streets and sidewalks of a downtown business district”); Burbridge v. Sampson, 74 F. Supp. 2d 940, 951 (C.D. Cal. 1999) (Collins, J.) (granting preliminary injunction against rule banning amplified sound on community college campus except in three “preferred areas” because the defendants “failed to rebut Plaintiffs’ claim that the ‘preferred areas’ do not meet the ‘ample alternatives for communications’ requirement for reasonable content-neutral, time place, and manner regulation”); Lionhart v. Foster, 100 F. Supp. 2d 383 (E.D. La. 1999) (holding that law “regulat[ing] the production of sound in excess of 55 decibels within 10 feet of  hospitals or churches during posted services” was “unreasonably  overbroad in the context of normal activities on public streets  and in public parks”).

Of course, even in a traditional public forum, reasonable  restrictions on the use of amplified sound are permitted, so long  as they are narrowly tailored to serve a significant government  interest. But, because “streets, sidewalks, parks and other similar public places are so historically associated with the exercise of First Amendment rights access to them for the purpose of exercising such rights cannot constitutionally be denied broadly and absolutely.” Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 u.s. 507, 515 (1976) (quotation marks and citation omitted). The Cit:y’s absolute ban on the use of amplified sound twenty-four hours per day on the Boardwalk except in a limited number of specially designated spaces simply sweeps too broadly and does not materially advance the City’s proffered interest. Because Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on their claim that  the amplified sound ban is facially overbroad (and because, as mentioned earlier, the balance of hardships and the public interest weigh in favor of enjoining regulations that violate the First Amendment), the Court GRANTS Plaintiffs’ motion for  preliminary injunction with respect to LAMC § 43.15 (F) (5).”

DEAN D. PREGERSON
United States District Judge

Federal Court 2002 case protecting amplification: Casey v. City of Newport 308 F.3d 106. 110 (1st. Cir. 2002)  Google Scholar Text, Law Resource Text

…amplifiers are also used to create new “messages” that cannot be conveyed without amplification equipment. Amplification enables performers to boost the relative volume of quiet instruments, such as the bass and the lower registers of the human voice, [*29] and to adjust the tonal qualities of voices and instruments without necessarily increasing the overall volume of the performance.

Much modern music simply cannot be performed without the use of amplifiers. Thus the ban on amplification has a direct and immediate effect on the expression at issue. The record therefore does not support the district court’s conclusion that appellants “could still convey their . . . messages” without amplification. Without amplification, some of the messages are not conveyed at all.

In restating its conclusion about the total ban on amplification, without additional analysis, the district court repeated its error of neglecting to consider the viability of the less-burdensome alternative of enforcing the City’s noise ordinance. We therefore remand to the district court for consideration [*34] of appellants’ challenge to the no-amplification-of-instruments restriction under the framework described in this opinion.

We have held that the district court erred in finding that the total ban on amplification was narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest. We conclude likewise with respect to the ban on amplification of instruments. In restating its conclusion about the total ban on amplification, without additional analysis, the district court repeated its error of neglecting to consider the viability of the less-burdensome alternative of enforcing the City’s noise ordinance.

CONCUR: McAULIFFE, District Judge (concurring)

In the world of modern music, “amplified” is not synonymous with “made louder.” Electronic musical instruments can only produce sound through a process of electronic amplification, but those instruments are not inherently louder than acoustic or unamplified instruments. A modern synthesizer, for example, can make sound only by means of electronic amplification, yet that amplified instrument easily and faithfully mimics the sounds produced by a wide range of acoustic instruments such as pianos, harps, flutes, acoustic guitars, violins, drums, etc. Moreover, the synthesizer can reproduce those musical sounds as softly and quietly as desired. Yet, the synthesizer falls within the City’s ban. An electronically amplified Aeolian Harp can produce the same “soft floating witchery of sound” as nature’s own, but the volume is more easily controlled on the amplified version.

Note: Periodically the courts hint about possible new areas to challenge in their opinions when they were not directly asked to review the issue in the current case. I’ve bolded, for emphasis, this hint from the Turley vs NYC, US 2nd Cir Appeal 98-7114 (1999):

Although we are concerned about the silencing of performers while their amplifiers are in police custody – and assume, without deciding, that in some circumstances a sound amplifier and similar equipment could be considered speech as opposed to its instrumentality – we affirm the district court’s ruling. In supplemental briefing on this issue, the City explained that the confiscation policy is necessary. Second note:  The above cited case did make this challenge in 2002 see: Casey v. City of Newport 308 F.3d 106. 110 (1st. Cir. 2002)

This case Carew-Reid v. Metropolitan Transportation Auth., 903 F2d 914 (2nd Cir. 1990) on amplified music on New York City subway platforms did allow a complete ban of amplification.A text version of the Carew-Reid decision is available on this site by clickinghere

By contrast, in the instant case the source of the “evil” is the medium of expression itself. Appellants have determined, after their experience under the experimental guidelines, that amplified music routinely produces excessive noise. The incidental effect of the amplifier ban, obviously, is that those musicians who previously used amplifiers on subway platforms will be forced to alter their performances or to perform elsewhere. Nevertheless, this restriction on the manner of their expression is justified because it is the manner itself that produces the evil that is the object of regulation, and, based on appellants’ showing, the regulation would be less effective absent this restriction. The amplifier ban therefore meets the narrow tailoring requirement….

The First Amendment, however, does not guarantee appellees access to every or even the best channels or locations for their expression. See Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. at 812. Appellees can perform in some of the subway mezzanines and above ground and still reach similar, if not the same, audiences that they could perform for on the subway platforms.

New Orleans street performers in Lionhart v. Foster 100 F.Supp.2d 383 (E.D.La.,1999) (Court Opinion PDF) won federal case that declared sound level of 55db to be unconstitutional. The judge refereed to cases which gave amplification First Amendment protection and cited cases in Houston 631 F.2d at 381 n. 1. The court noted that “there is probably no more appropriate place for reasonably amplified speech than the streets and sidewalks of a downtown business district.” District of Columbia Circuit struck down a federal regulation which prohibited the playing of musical instruments at a level higher than “60 decibels measured on the A-weighted scale at 50 feet.” (The last case also included the playing of drums in front of the White House)

Lionhart v. Foster 100 F.Supp.2d 383 (E.D.La.,1999) (Court Opinion PDF) Case Quote:

When First Amendment freedoms are implicated, the Court must place these freedoms in a preferred position. See id.; accord Reeves, 631 F.2d at 383. The government bears the burden of justifying its regulation as narrowly tailored. See Doe, 968 F.2d at 90.

The state’s asserted interest in preserving the tranquility of the community against excessive noise is clearly legitimate. See Ward, 491 U.S. at 796, 109 S.Ct. at 2756; Kovacs, 336 U.S. at 87-88, 69 S.Ct. at 453-54; Reeves, 631 F.2d at 384. However, the importance of First Amendment freedoms necessitates that the state regulate in this area only with narrow specificity.

When the government chooses to prohibit sound levels in public places that are not demonstrably disturbing, the courts will reject the regulation as overly broad. For example, in Reeves v. McConn, the Fifth Circuit invalidated a Houston ordinance prohibiting the operation of sound amplifying equipment in excess of 20 watts within 100 yards of any hospital, school, church, or courthouse. 631 F.2d at 381 n. 1. The court noted that “there is probably no more appropriate place for reasonably amplified speech than the streets and sidewalks of a downtown business district.” Id. at 384. See also Beckerman v. City of Tupelo, 664 F.2d at 516 (“Because this ordinance extends its total and non-discretionary prohibition to areas which have not been shown to be incompatible with sound equipment, it is unconstitutionally overbroad.”). The court stated that, in addition to the “narrowly tailored” requirement, the number of watts chosen as the point of regulation must also be reasonable. See Reeves, 631 F.2d at 387. The city could not broadly prohibit reasonably amplified speech simply because it feared that disruption might sometimes result. See id. at 388. Relying on the plaintiff’s uncontroverted expert testimony that sound amplification in excess of 20 watts could be non-disruptive, the court held the ordinance unconstitutionally overbroad to the extent that it limited the sound level to 20 watts. See id. at 387-88. The Fifth Circuit stated that “there is no valid state interest in prohibiting amplified sound that does not actually cause, or imminently threaten to cause, material disruption at these [schools, churches, courthouses] locations.” Id. at 385.

On similar facts, the District of Columbia Circuit struck down a federal regulation which prohibited the playing of musical instruments at a level higher than “60 decibels measured on the A-weighted scale at 50 feet.” Doe, 968 F.2d at 89-90. Defendants there were arrested under the regulation for chanting and beating drums in Lafayette Park across from the White House during a war protest. See id. at 87. The court observed that ” ‘excessive’ noise by definition means something above and beyond the ordinary noises associated with the appropriate and customary uses of the park.” Id. at 89. The defendant proffered evidence that loud conversations exceed 60 decibels, and the government offered nothing to show that the chosen decibel level prohibited only disturbing or excessive speech activity. See id. at 90-91 (“Where constitutionally protected activity is implicated, we cannot simply defer to the Park Service’s unexplained judgment.”). The court therefore found that the government failed to carry its burden of showing that the regulation was narrowly *388 tailored to further its interest in preventing excessive noise in a traditional public forum. See id. See also U.S. Labor Party v. Pomerleau, 557 F.2d 410, 413 (4th Cir.1977) (invalidating city anti-noise ordinance when decibel level prohibited noise no greater than person speaking slightly louder than normal); Maldonado v. County of Monterey, 330 F.Supp. 1282, 1286 (N.D.Cal.1971) (finding unconstitutional county ordinance prohibiting any amplification of human voice above normal speaking level from all public highways). [7]

Here, La.Rev.Stat. § 14:103.2 regulates the production of sound in excess of 55 decibels within 10 feet of hospitals or churches during posted services. Unlike the cited cases, however, the Louisiana statute does not flatly prohibit the production of sound in excess of the stated decibel level. Rather, producing sound above this level in these locations can be prosecuted if one does so “in a manner likely to disturb, inconvenience, or annoy a person of ordinary sensibilities.” La.Rev.Stat. § 14:103.2. The Court concludes, however, that because the 55 decibel level threshold is so unreasonably overbroad in the context of normal activities on public streets and in public parks, the added requirement that the sound be made in a manner that is likely to annoy or disturb someone does not save it.

Lionhart v. Foster, 100 F.Supp.2d 383 (E.D.La.,1999) (Court Opinion PDF)

New Orleans artists also received a preliminary injunction restraining order on May 31, 1996 when the city tried to impose a inaudible at 25 foot requirement Case 96-1869 (E.D.La.,1996) 

ROSELYN LIONHART, et al versus CITY OF NEW ORLEANS, et al;1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18903 (December 13, 1996).  The City of Ithica, New York also had an inaudible at 25 foot volume restriction that was challenged by a street preacher in DEEGAN v. CITY OF ITHACA, 444 F.3d 135 (2006).

We find that the challenged noise ordinances, as interpreted, construed, and enforced by Defendants against Deegan cannot withstand constitutional scrutiny. Therefore, we remand the case to the District Court with instructions to enter judgment in favor of Deegan and award him appropriate relief.

[T]he Court finds that Katra made his measurements in February at the same place and time of day as the October 9, 1999 incident in issue; that 56 decibels was the maximum noise level at which a person could speak and still be in compliance with the ordinance 50 percent of the time; that this decibel level is lower than that generated by the clicking of high-heeled boots, conversations between two or three people, a shop door opening and closing, a small child playing on a playground and a cellular telephone; that most normal human activity would be clearly audible at a distance of 25 feet; and that a spirited conversation between two people would be clearly audible at a distance of 25 feet. The Court further finds that there is no evidence regarding how many people were in “close proximity” (six to eight feet) of plaintiff while he was preaching; that Katra did not measure the decibel level of plaintiff’s preaching; that the duration of a loud sound is an important factor in whether it is annoying or alarming; and that factors such as annoyance and alarm cannot be scientifically measured.

Quite simply, a noise regulation that prohibits “most normal human activity,” including a spirited conversation by only two people, is not narrowly tailored to serve the City’s interest in maintaining a reasonable level of sound, at least in a public forum like the Commons.

DEEGAN v. CITY OF ITHACA, 444 F.3d 135 (2006). http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F3/444/135/546275/  or https://law.resource.org/pub/us/case/reporter/F3/444/444.F3d.135.html

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Freedom is a Constant Struggle– Keep the Faith

Stephen H. Baird, August 2006

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Amplification Ethics

The use of loud speakers and amplifiers on the streets is a volatile issue. The United States Supreme Court and the lower courts have ruled on the issue many times. See the American Law Review, 10 ALR2d 627-634 for a general overview. The court cases: Saia v New York, 334 US 558 (1948); Kovacs v Cooper, 336 US 77 (1949); Phillips v Township of Darby, 305 F. Supp. 765 (1969); Maldonada v County of Monterey, 330 F. Supp. 1282 (1971); US Labor Party v Rochford, 416 F. Supp. 204 (1975); US Labor Party v Pomerleau, 557 F2d 410 (1977); and Reeves v McConn, 631 F2d 337 (1980); Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 109 S. Ct. 2746 (1989); Carew-Reid v. Metropolitan Transportation Auth., 903 F2d 914 (2nd Cir. 1990) should be seen for specific information.

A prior restraint involves discretion over some form of protected expression, and Madison contends that only speech, not amplified speech, enjoys First Amendment protection. This is incorrect. The First Amendment protects effective speech, not merely uttered words, and effective speech sometimes requires that ideas be transformed into musical speech, loud speech, financial speech or other forms of expression that a casual reading of the First Amendment might not reveal as “speech.”

Stokes v City of Madison

United States Court of Appeals Seventh Circuit., 930 F.2d 1163, 59 USLW 2652, (1991)

In general, the courts have suggested amplification should be allowed, but regulated by wattage (power) or decibels (volume). The US Supreme Court, however, has let stand a blanket prohibition of sound trucks. In the Carew-Reid v. Metropolitan Transportation Auth, 903 F2d 914 (2nd Cir. 1990) the 2nd Circuit court considered electronic music on subway platforms as a unique artistic medium covered by the First Amendment. but still allowed a total ban of amplified music. This court specifically rejected the less restrictive alternative offered by decibel meter enforcement, because “electronic amplifiers…carry the potential for producing sound above the regulation’s limits with as little effort as a simple twist of a knob.”

The abusive use of amplification by a few individuals can and has caused considerable damage to the free use of public spaces for the dissemination of artistic ideas. Police and public officials often will ban street performances altogether instead of assuming the responsibility of selective enforcement when confronted by excessive use of amplifiers. Munich, Amsterdam, and other European cities banned street performances because some street artists from the U.S. incessantly kept their amplifiers too loud. Several cities in the U.S., including Boston for a while, were closed for the same reason.

Large corporations, institutions, churches and governmental organizations can and have used amplification devices on streets and parks. Individual street performers can not possibly compete if money, volume in this case is left unchecked. The amplification devices will just get bigger and bigger until only one or two performances can be heard. The louder the amplifiers the fewer artists can survive. Read “For Sale: Freedom of Speech,” by Charles Rembar, Atlantic Monthly, March, 1981, pp. 22-32, or Lawrence H. Tribe’s Constitutional Choices, Harvard University Press, 1985, for a comprehensive discussion about the imbalance of money and First Amendment issues in Supreme Court decisions.

The “double standard” and bias toward state sponsored amplified events and parades, large organization amplified demonstrations, mass transportation, construction and other commercial activities such as air conditioners and building ventilation systems which all exceed decibels levels of 80-100db is to be expected. Over 90% of the Federal Judges have been appointed by conservative administrations and they have reversed the previous long standing least restrictive analysis precedents. Court cases will not help on this issue and the battle will have to won politically. The political battle can not be won if the street performing community is divided by the few individuals who abuse their amplifiers and if those same individuals are allowed to antagonize the residents and local businesses.

The political strategy is to keep maximum sound levels below the background noise which is usually 80db on a busy city street (measured at 25 feet which gives an artist a 50 foot circle to communicate with a crowd). It is ethically hard for residents, businesses and public officials to protest a sound level that is at the same level of sound they themselves create. This will not work unless there are ways to enforce and fine artists who exceed the sound levels. The background sound levels decrease in the evenings (less traffic) and these sound levels will be more discernible at greater distances, which can cause more complaints (It is not louder but can be more intrusive because of less “white” background noise as a cover.). It is therefor harder to get performances past 11:00 pm unless it is a commercial area with few residences. All these issues point to a comprehensive and complicated street performance ordinance with volume regulations. Courts do not write laws and these issues must be won through the legislative process (It has been done in Cambridge, MA with provisions for amplification at 80 db at 25 feet and protection for residents with 60 db daytime or 50 db at night provided the background noise is exceeded by 10 db(A)).

While conducting research for my book, “The History and Cultural Impact of Street Performing,” I have interviewed street audiences and have found the audiences preferred a varied and diverse group of street acts to choose from. They would be less likely to stop and stay, or bring their friends, if one street performer or group dominated an area. The audiences were more likely to donate to performers who were approachable and not to performers that intimidated them with volume (walls of sound).

Questions immediately arise: Are messages being forced upon the public through ever increasing amplification? Is the lack of audience due to the inability of being heard or by the style of presentation, or by the actual ideas themselves?

There is no question that electronic music is a protected contemporary form of First Amendment expression, which necessitates some form of amplification. However, the courts and public officials are often unwilling to distinguish between those who use amplifiers sensitively and those who abuse them. While these officials must be pressured and educated to make discerning instead of absolute judgments, there is no substitute for awareness and sensitivity by the street artists who use amplifiers.

Final note: I often campare sound levels measurements by decibel meter with speed measurements of cars by radar devises. The failure of municipal, state and federal legislatures to require current technology and science to measure sound in noise ordinances leaves the government workers, police and courts into a quagmire of linguistic uncertainty over the definitions of “annoying” and “unreasonable” sound enforcement definitions. I wonder how many judges, legislators and even police would accept being convicted for speeding with no radar readings and just the observation that they were going unreasonably to fast.

Two Views of a Saturday Night

First View: On a Saturday night in Harvard Square thirty different artists- two jugglers, two magicians, one mime, three clowns, a five person musical group from South America, a three person blues band, a storyteller, a three piece jazz band, a solo rock act, three solo folk acts, and a three piece rock band are playing. Each group has about 50-200 people watching (1500-6000 people total). During the breaks the crowd shifts between all the different groups. Over 300-400 people will visit each artists in the evening during these shifts. There is a lot of excitement. The crowds are generous and they come back with their friends. “If you like this act wait till you see the next one!”

Second View: On a Saturday night in Harvard Square thirty different artists set up. One rock band sets up in the middle of Brattle Square and turns the volume so loud that all other acts have to stop their show. Immediately 300-400 people who like rock music and other curious people converge. The crowd expands and then reduces to the number who can see and participate (300-400 people total). During the breaks there is no crowd shifts because there are no other crowds. When the second show begins the audience consists of many the same people and donations go down dramatically. There is no diversity. There is no excitement. People do not come back. Weeks later the crowds will continue to grow smaller (Note: It is now easier for businesses and governmental authorities to curtail street music because less people will protest.). “I’ve seen that group before. They’re here all the time. Let’s go to a movie”

Conclusion: The first view it is a real cultural movement- full of diversity, different cultures, conflicting opinions and ideas, a real community that cares about and for each individual. A community that understands the interdependence between people.

The second view is the usual problem of poverty’s blind rage. Rock music is one of the primary vehicles for expressing that rage. And clearly rage needs to be expressed. The streets are in fact one of the best forums. However, did burning down the ghetto cure poverty? Is the message of rock street music going to say we don’t care about other street artists- tough luck if that storyteller is too old to compete, so what if that classical duo is expecting a baby, I don’t care if the clubs are so racist that the Hispanic artists can’t play anywhere else…. Are we as a community going to allow rock music to be used as a tool of oppression?

Street Artists Code of Ethics

1. We acknowledge each individual’s First Amendment/Self Expression Rights with mutual respect and in cooperative spirit.

2. Spaces are allocated on a first-come-first-serve basis. Artists are encouraged to share spaces.

3. Artists should not set up within 50 feet of another artist(s) without first consulting with that artist(s). Rotating sets are encouraged in crowded situations.

4. Artists should generally not be heard more than a 50 foot radius from their performance site. Loud and amplified instruments/voices heard beyond 50 feet are considered an infringement upon other artists’ First Amendment/Self Expression Rights.

5. Artists using loud and amplified instruments/voices are encouraged to:

a. Find locations that conflict or interfere with the fewest artists and cause fewest community complaints.

b. Turn amplifiers/drums/loud instruments in toward walls and/or baffle with blankets to dampen and confine sounds to immediate area.

c. Schedule and/or rotate performance times that conflict or interfere with the fewest artists and cause fewest community complaints.

d. Consult with other street artists in immediate performing area about volume and seek mutual solutions.

6. Street artists acknowledge the importance of the streets and parks as an historic forum for all artists and community members, acknowledge the importance of the cultural diversity expressed on the streets and in parks, and acknowledge the importance of the street arts in the continuing growth of a world community.

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Street Arts and Buskers Advocates

• Street Arts Advocates Email List
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• Legal Issues
  • Legal Court Citations article by Stephen Baird
    • Goldstein v. Town of Nantucket, 477 F. Supp., 606, (1979)
    • Davenport v Alexandria, VA 683 F2d 853 (1983), 710 F2d 148 (1983), 748 F2d 208 (1984)
    • Friedrich v Chicago 619 F. Supp., 1129. (D.C. Ill 1985)
    • Carew-Reid v. Metropolitan Transportation Auth., 903 F2d 914 (2nd Cir. 1990) (Subway)
    • Jews for Jesus v. Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority (1991) (Subway)
    • Bery v. New York, 97 F. 3d 684 (2d Cir. 1996)
    • Turley v. NYC 988 F.Supp, 667 & 675 (1997). See US 2nd Cir Appeal 98-7114 (1999)
    • Perry v. LAPD, US 9th Cir Appeals 96-55545 (1997)
    • Horton v. St. Augustine, Florida US 11th Cir Appeal No. 00-16220 (2001)
    • Christopher Mastrovincinzo (a.k.a. “MASTRO”), and Kevin Santos (a.k.a. “NAC” OR “NAK”) v NEW YORK CITY 313 F SUPP 2D 280 (2004)
  • Boston Legal Battle 1972-2004
    • Overview with articles and photographs
    • Police Rule 75
    • FLASH NEWS: Federal Law Suit to protect rights of street artists in Boston
      • Complaint Motion
      • Preliminary Injunction Motion
      • Response From City of Boston
      • Reply and Second Memorandum
      • Federal Court Hearing December 17, 2004
      • City Repeals Police Rules and Regulations determined Unconstitutional in Federal Court on December 23, 2004
      • Issues and timeline
      • Media articles
      • Petition
  • Boston MBTA Subway Legal Battle 1986-2004
    • Overview with articles and photographs
    • December 2003 MBTA Restrictions Battle
    • Wesleyan University Olin Fellowship Thesis by Maggie Starr
    • MBTA-Radio Threatens Subway Performances October 2007
  • Cambridge Legal Battle 1973-2003
    • Overview with articles and photographs
    • Cambridge, MA Ordinance
  • Alexandria, Virginia Legal Battle 1982-1984
    • Overview with articles and photographs
    • Historical statement by Stephen Baird
    • Davenport v Alexandria, VA 683 F2d 853 (1983), 710 F2d 148 (1983), 748 F2d 208 (1984)
  • Baltimore, Maryland Legal Battle 2002 on
    • Overview with articles and photographs
  • Chicago Legal Battle 1982-1986
    • Overview with articles and photographs
    • Urban Studies Statement by Dr. Allan Schnaiberg, Professor of Sociology and Urban Affairs at Northwestern University
    • Friedrich v Chicago 619 F. Supp., 1129. (D.C. Ill 1985)
  • New Orleans Legal Battle
    • New Orleans Code
  • New York City Street Entertainers 1700 – 2005
    • Mayor LaGuadia bans New York City street entertainers 1935
    • South Street Seaport
  • Provincetown, Massachusetts Street Performers
  • Saint Augustine, Florida Legal Battle 1998 on
    • Horton v. St. Augustine, Florida US 11th Cir Appeal No. 00-16220 (2001)
  • Salt Lake City, Utah Legal Battle 2001 on
    • Salt Lake City, Utah Ordinance
  • Santa Cruz, California Legal Battle 1978-2003
    • Santa Cruz Street Performance Voluntary Guidelines
  • Seattle, Washington, 1974 on
  • Waikiki Street Performers Win Lawsuit 2002
  • The Malling of America: The Selling of America’s Public Parks and Streets–The Economic Censorship and Suppression of First Amendment Rights article by Stephen Baird
    • Citizens to End Animal Suffering v Faneuil Hall Marketplace, Inc., 745 F. Supp. 65 (1990)
  • Amplification Ethics article by Stephen Baird
• Model Regulations introduction and three samples
  • Cambridge, MA
  • Worcester, MA
  • Chicago, IL
  • Hartford, CT
  • East Lansing, MI
  • St. Louis, MO
  • Toledo, OH
  • Santa Monica, CA
  • Sidewalk Democracy: Municipalities and the Regulation of Public Space
• Performance Locations
  • Introduction
  • North America
  • South America
  • Europe
  • Asia, Australia, New Zealand, Africa
• History and Cultural Impact of Street Performing in America
  • Avenues of Self Expression article by Stephen Baird
  • Ben Franklin on the Streets of Boston in 1718
  • Busking in Colonial Williamsburg in 1738
  • Rope Walking from Church Steeple in 1757
  • Patrick Henry and Sam Adams on the Revolutionary Streets
  • Nathaniel Hawthorne “All vagrants are interesting”
  • Boston Street Music 1869
  • Irving Berlin to George Burns–Immigrants Fill The Streets With Music
  • Bessie Smith, Blind Lemon Jefferson, Eubie Blake, Reverend Gary Davis, Louis Armstrong and the African American Diaspora on the Streets
  • Mayor La Guardia Bans Street Music in New York City in 1935
  • Hurdy-gurdy man Marino Persechini in Boston 1899-1974
  • Street Artists in Fine Arts Paintings, Photographs and Films
  • Books and References
    • Sidewalk Democracy: Municipalities and the Regulation of Public Space
  • Women Street Performers and Sexual Safety By Kirsten Anderberg
• History and Cultural Impact of Street Performing International
  • Germany 1990
  • “In Transit Railscapes” — India’s Street and Transit Music By Navin Thomas
• Links and References
  • General References
  • City and Government Regulation Web Sites
    • Sidewalk Democracy: Municipalities and the Regulation of Public Space
  • Individual Performer and Artists Web Sites
  • Professional Vaudeville Organization and School Web Sites
  • Busker and Street Performer Festival Web Sites
  • Performance Opportunities
  • Research Web Sites
• Street and Vaudeville Artists Directory Data Base
  • Mimes, Magicians, Musicians, Jugglers, Jesters, Sidewalk Chalk Artists, Clowns, Puppeteers, Storytellers and !!!
• Street Artists Photo-Journalism Project
  • Project Description
  • Consent and Release Agreement
  • The Photos
  • Introduction, Background and Services

Case Information

22-8-00057-23 | STATE OF WASHINGTON vs ZACKARY BUSBY

Case Number
22-8-00057-23

Court
Mason

File Date
10/28/2022

Case Type
JUV Juvenile Offender

Case Status
Active

Party

Plaintiff (Criminal)
STATE OF WASHINGTON

Active Attorneys
Lead AttorneyWilcox, Bailey James

---

---

Juvenile Respondent (WIP)
BUSBY, ZACKARY

DOB
XX/XX/2005

Active Attorneys
Lead AttorneyFinlay, Bruce J.

Retained

State’s Complaining Witness: Katherine K.

---

Charge

Charges
BUSBY, ZACKARY

		Description	Statute	Level	Date
	1	Rape 3rd Degree	9A.44.060	Felony C	04/29/2022

Events and Hearings

• 1 10/28/2022 Notice of Hearing View Document Notice of Hearing
• 2 10/28/2022 Information View Document Information
• 3 11/01/2022 Arraignment Original Type
  Arraignment View Document Mason MinutesJudicial Officer
  Ferguson-Brown, Cadine Hearing Time
  9:30 AM Result
  Held Parties Present Plaintiff (Criminal): STATE OF WASHINGTON Deputy Prosecuting Attorney: Wilcox, Bailey James Juvenile Respondent (WIP): BUSBY, ZACKARY
• 4 11/01/2022 Motion Hearing View Document Mason MinutesJudicial Officer
  Ferguson-Brown, Cadine
• 5 11/01/2022 Notice of Appearance and Request for Discovery View Document Notice of Appearance and Request for Discovery
• 6 11/01/2022 Order of Continuance View Document Order of Continuance Judicial Officer
  Ferguson-Brown, Cadine
• 7 11/08/2022 Arraignment Original Type
  Arraignment View Document Mason Minutes Judicial Officer
  Ferguson-Brown, Cadine Hearing Time
  9:30 AM Result
  Held Parties PresentPlaintiff (Criminal): STATE OF WASHINGTON Deputy Prosecuting Attorney: Wilcox, Bailey James Juvenile Respondent (WIP): BUSBY, ZACKARY Attorney: Finlay, Bruce J.
• 8 11/08/2022 Dismissal Hearing View Document Mason Minutes Judicial Officer
  Ferguson-Brown, Cadine

Download them now before the miscreants remove them from public view–especially the ones documenting American soldiers murdering unarmed civilians in Baghdad, laughing about it during the U.S. invasion of Iraq.

COLLATERAL MURDER

Wikileaks Disgorges All Files to the Public

Wikileaks just dumped all of their files online. Everything from Hillary Clinton’s emails, McCain’s being guilty, Vegas shooting done by an FBI sniper, Steve Jobs HIV letter, PedoPodesta, Afghanistan, Syria, Iran, Bilderberg, CIA agents arrested for rape, WHO pandemic.

Hilary Clinton E-Mails

Wikileaks INDEX

State auditor: Mason County Fire District 12 misused nearly $200k in public funds

(Courtesy of Shawn Garrett, KIRO 7 News and Gwen Baumgardner, KIRO 7 News)

A fraud investigation report from the Washington State Auditor’s office revealed that nearly $200,000 in public funds were misappropriated by a Mason County fire chief and her secretary.

The state auditor recommended to the District to file a police report about the loss of public funds from January 1, 2017 through July 31, 2022, but as of Aug. 17, no police report had been filed.

The investigation, which began in September 2021, determined misappropriations involving payroll, credit card and other disbursements totaling $68,672 were made between October 2017 and July 2022.

Also, the report determined that auditors were unable to identify whether $95,093 in expenditures from May 2017 to July 2022 were for legitimate business purposes.

According to the report, the District only employs the fire chief and a secretary. The fire chief is responsible for managing the District’s financial operations, including payroll.

Additionally, the one of the Mason County commissioners is married to the District secretary. The fire chief is their daughter.

According to the report, the fire chief was hired as the temporary fire chief in April 2018, made permanent in August 2018, terminated by the board in May 2022, then immediately made temporary fire chief again.

The secretary, the fire chief’s mother, was hired in August 2020 and resigned in March 2022.

The fire chief is responsible for preparing two paychecks – one for herself and one for her mother, the secretary.

According to the report, the fire chief paid herself $2,973 in September 2019 as a vacation leave buyout, which was not allowed in her contract.

The fire chief also paid herself five additional paychecks in 2020 and three additional paychecks in 2021, totaling $20,364.

The report also said the fire chief paid herself several times in advance and received $2,982 in unsupported payroll payments.

The fire chief also received $37,104 in payroll payments after her contract was terminated in May 2022, including two questionable severance payments totaling $30,155.

According to the report, the secretary received two additional paychecks in 2020 and three additional paychecks in 2021, totaling $8,839.

After her resignation in March 2022, she received a buyout for vacation and sick leave totaling $3,875, and an additional $1,240 in questionable pay.

The commissioner, who is married to the Secretary, received three meeting paychecks for unknown reasons in 2020, totaling $693.

He also received 10 questionable payments totaling $10,100, of which $5,709 was for maintenance services. The report was unable to determine if these services were actually performed.

The report said the District has not reported quarterly payroll tax payments to the IRS since December 2018.

The fire chief is also responsible for the District’s credit card purchases and paying those balances.

A review of the credit card activity from January 1, 2017, to May 29, 2020, showed the District had not made a credit card payment since January 2020, and had an outstanding balance of $36,841 when the credit card was closed on May 29, 2020 for having the outstanding balance.

The report said the fire chief misappropriated $16,579 and is responsible for $13,941 for purchases that included televisions, movie and music streaming services, groceries, clothing, holiday dishware and personal items, including jewelry, hair spray and school supplies. The purchases also included $1,994 in plastic kitchen products that were delivered to members of her family.

The commissioner’s credit card was also used for $472 in prepaid cellular cards and a flooring supply purchase.

Additional employee reimbursements totaling $18,831 were also misappropriated by the fire chief. For example, $2,000 for “wildland supplies” and $500 for “picnic supplies” was not supported by any records.

Another $20,811 in payments were made to a cellular vendor. The fire chief bought six cellphones and six smart watches, and not only was the report not able to locate the items in the District’s possession, but there was no business purpose for 13 of the 16 phone lines.

In April 2022, the auditor’s office interviewed the fire chief and the commissioner, who said she did not know why she received more paychecks than usual or why some paychecks were issued in advance.

The fire chief also told investigators she bought groceries for holiday parties and a summer barbecue, but the auditor’s office pointed out several of the purchases were small enough to indicate personal usage and not party supplies. She said the groceries were actually for Saturday drills and snacks that were kept at the station and their vehicles.

The fire chief also said the credit card balance was paid each month and that she did not know why the District stopped using credit cards, and did not know about the outstanding balance or that the account was closed.

The commissioner said he did not know the fire chief received extra paychecks, or that the secretary (his wife) received extra paychecks.

The secretary never responded to interview requests from the auditor’s office.

In a written response to the allegations in the auditor’s report, the District said:

“The Board of Commissioners of Mason County Fire Protection District No. 12 is committed to operating transparently and in full compliance with the law. We appreciate the Auditor’s efforts in identifying areas of concern and the District is working to further investigate and address the allegations contained in this report.

“Given the short deadline for providing a response to this report, and not having access to the Auditor’s supporting documentation, the District is unable to provide a detailed factual response within the constraints of the Audit report format. The District is following the recommendation of the Auditor to investigate the allegations, is retaining an attorney to assist with further investigation into the allegations and the District will take appropriate action if it determines that any of the allegations are sustained.

“The Board of Commissioners recognizes that Auditor’s report of misappropriation and questionable expenditures is based primarily on an absence of supporting records. The Board of Commissioners is working to implement better record keeping processes and is working to improve its process of reviewing and approving expenditures to avoid similar issues in the future.

“The Board has already begun working with the IRS to bring the District into full compliance with all reporting requirements.

“The Board believes that once it has the chance to further investigate the allegations contained in the report the majority of the Auditor’s concerns will be addressed by the District’s investigation and the District is confident that the investigation will determine that no fraud occurred.”

The report said this case would be referred to the Mason County Prosecuting Attorney’s Office and the IRS for further consideration.

At Tuesday’s Mason County’s Board of Commissioners meeting, the audit was presented to the public by the auditor’s office, however no additional comments were made by District lawyer Brian Snure and referred to the written statement.

State auditor Pat McCarthy said, “I know it can be challenging to manage local government, but the issues we raised are all intended to serve your community.”

During the ending of the online meeting, several comments were seen on the screen from the Mason County community, however the board refused to hear public comments and quickly ended the meeting.

Case Information

19-2-03499-31 | Shaunessy Homeowners Association et al vs Richard Heng et al
Case Number
19-2-03499-31

Court
Snohomish

File Date
04/22/2019

Case Type
COM Commercial

Case Status
Completed/Re-Completed

Party

Plaintiff
Shaunessy Homeowners Association

Active Attorneys
Lead AttorneyMASCH, BRETT

Retained

---

Garnishee Defendant (Participant)
Department of Social & Health Services

---

Defendant
Heng, Richard

Active Attorneys
Pro Se

---

Defendant
Heng, Mary

Active Attorneys
Pro Se

---

Disposition Events

02/14/2020 Judgment

---

Judicial Officer
Farris, Anita L

Judgment Type
General Recovery

---

Monetary/Property Award

Creditors: Shaunessy Homeowners Association

Debtors: Heng, Mary

Signed Date: 02/14/2020

Filed Date: 02/14/2020

Effective Date: 02/14/2020

Current Judgment Status:

Status: Active

Status Date: 02/14/2020

Monetary Award:

Fee: Principal, Amount: $17,337.27 , Interest: 12.00 %

Total: $17,337.27

Comment

Comment ()

09/01/2020 Judgment

Judicial Officer
Brudvik, Jacalyn D

Judgment Type
General Recovery

Monetary/Property Award

Creditors: Shaunessy Homeowners Association

Debtors: Lexington Enterprises Inc, Heng, Richard

Signed Date: 08/28/2020

Filed Date: 09/01/2020

Effective Date: 09/01/2020

Current Judgment Status:

Status: Active

Status Date: 09/01/2020

Monetary Award:

Fee: Principal, Amount: $17,248.24 , Interest: 12.00 %

Total: $17,248.24

Comment

Comment ()

04/08/2022 Judgment

Judicial Officer
Moore, Karen

Judgment Type
General Recovery

Monetary/Property Award

Creditors: Shaunessy Homeowners Association

Debtors: Heng, Richard

Signed Date: 04/08/2022

Filed Date: 04/08/2022

Effective Date: 04/08/2022

Current Judgment Status:

Status: Active

Status Date: 04/08/2022

Monetary Award:

Fee: Principal, Amount: $26,661.87 , Interest: 12.00 %

Total: $26,661.87

Comment

Comment ()

---

Events and Hearings

• 1 04/22/2019 Summons View Document Summons
• 2 04/22/2019 Complaint View Document Complaint
• 3 04/22/2019 Case Information Cover Sheet View Document Case Information Cover Sheet
• 4 05/22/2019 Affidavit Declaration Certificate Confirmation of Service View Document Affidavit Declaration Certificate Confirmation of Service
• 5 05/31/2019 Declaration of Mailing View Document Declaration of Mailing
• 6 05/31/2019 Amended Summons View Document Amended SummonsComment
  by Mail for Monies Due
• 7 06/18/2019 Affidavit Declaration Certificate Confirmation of Service View Document Affidavit Declaration Certificate Confirmation of Service
• 8 06/20/2019 Affidavit Declaration Certificate Confirmation of Service View Document Affidavit Declaration Certificate Confirmation of Service
• 9 06/20/2019 Notice of Appearance View Document Notice of Appearance
• 10 06/20/2019 Answer and Affirmative Defense View Document Answer and Affirmative Defense
• 11 06/24/2019 Affidavit Declaration Certificate Confirmation of Service View Document Affidavit Declaration Certificate Confirmation of Service
• 12 07/29/2019 Motion for Default View Document Motion for Default
• 13 07/29/2019 Order of Default View Document Order of Default Judicial Officer
  Gaer, Susan C Comment
  (vacated as to Richard Heng 07/07/2021)
• 07/29/2019 Ex Parte Action With Order
• 14 01/15/2020 Declaration of Mailing View Document Declaration of Mailing
• 15 01/15/2020 Motion for Summary Judgment View Document Motion for Summary Judgment
• 16 15 01/15/2020 Affidavit in Support View Document Affidavit in Support Comment
  Lisa McMahon-Myhran
• 17 01/15/2020 Proposed Order Findings View Document Proposed Order Findings
• 18 01/15/2020 Proposed Order Findings View Document Proposed Order Findings
• 19 01/15/2020 Note for Calendar View Document Note for Calendar
• 02/14/2020 Summary Judgment Judicial Officer
  Farris, Anita L Hearing Time
  9:30 AM Comment
  -Masch -CONFIRMED/MASCH
• 20 02/14/2020 Summary Judgment Hearing View Document Summary Judgment HearingJudicial Officer
  Farris, Anita L
• 21 02/14/2020 Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law View Document Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
• 22 02/14/2020 Order Granting Summary Judgment View Document Order Granting Summary Judgment Comment
  as to Mary Heng
• 23 09/01/2020 Motion for Default Judgment View Document Motion for Default Judgment
• 24 09/01/2020 Affidavit in Support View Document Affidavit in Support Comment
  of Tom Gish
• 25 09/01/2020 Default Judgment View Document Default JudgmentJudicial Officer
  Brudvik, Jacalyn D Comment
  (vacated as to Richard Heng)
• 09/01/2020 Ex Parte Action With Order
• 26 02/11/2021 Writ of Garnishment View Document Writ of Garnishment
• 03/05/2021 Affidavit Declaration Certificate Confirmation of Service View Document Affidavit Declaration Certificate Confirmation of Service
• 27 03/26/2021 Answer to Writ View Document Answer to Writ
• 28 05/07/2021 Notice of Appearance View Document Notice of Appearance
• 29 05/10/2021 Declaration Affidavit View Document Declaration AffidavitComment
  of Mary Heng
• 30 05/10/2021 Declaration Affidavit View Document Declaration AffidavitComment
  of Richard Heng
• 31 05/10/2021 Declaration Affidavit View Document Declaration Affidavit Comment
  of Sophie Bo
• 32 05/10/2021 Motion for Order to Show Cause View Document Motion for Order to Show CauseComment
  and Motion to Vacate Default Judgement
• 33 05/11/2021 Notice of Appearance View Document Notice of Appearance
• 34 05/11/2021 Motion for Order to Show Cause View Document Motion for Order to Show Cause Comment
  & motion to vacate default judgment
• 35 05/11/2021 Declaration Affidavit View Document Declaration Affidavit Comment
  of Mary Heng
• 36 05/11/2021 Declaration Affidavit View Document Declaration Affidavit Comment
  of Sophie Bo
• 37 05/11/2021 Declaration Affidavit View Document Declaration Affidavit Comment
  of Richard Heng
• 38 05/11/2021 Order to Show Cause View Document Order to Show CauseJudicial Officer
  Waggoner, Tracy G
• 05/11/2021 Ex Parte Action With Order
• 39 05/19/2021 Acceptance of Service View Document Acceptance of Service
• 40 06/04/2021 Affidavit Declaration Certificate Confirmation of Service View Document Affidavit Declaration Certificate Confirmation of Service
• 41 06/04/2021 Response View Document Response Comment
  to motion to vacate
• 42 06/04/2021 Affidavit Declaration Certificate Confirmation of Service View Document Affidavit Declaration Certificate Confirmation of Service
• 43 06/04/2021 Stipulation View Document Stipulation Comment
  for electronic service
• 44 06/08/2021 Reply View Document Reply Comment
  declaration of Richard Heng
• 45 06/08/2021 Declaration Affidavit View Document Declaration Affidavit Comment
  of Mary Heng / supplemental
• 46 06/08/2021 Memorandum View Document Memorandum Comment
  in strict reply
• 06/09/2021 Show Cause Judicial Officer
  Waggoner, Tracy G Hearing Time
  10:30 AMComment
  on motion to vacate default judgment -CONFIRMED/EHRLICH
• 47 06/09/2021 Motion Hearing View Document Motion HearingJudicial Officer
  Waggoner, Tracy G
• 48 06/09/2021 Order Denying Motion Petition View Document Order Denying Motion Petition Judicial Officer
  Waggoner, Tracy G
• 06/09/2021 Ex Parte Action With Order
• 49 06/18/2021 Motion for Revision View Document Motion for Revision
• 50 06/18/2021 Note for Calendar View Document Note for Calendar
• 51 06/25/2021 Response View Document Response Comment
  to motion for revision
• 52 06/25/2021 Affidavit Declaration Certificate Confirmation of Service View Document Affidavit Declaration Certificate Confirmation of Service
• 53 06/28/2021 Reply View Document Reply Comment
  to Response to Revision/Dfdt’s
• 54 06/28/2021 Affidavit of Mailing View Document Affidavit of Mailing
• 55 06/29/2021 Note for Calendar View Document Note for Calendar
• 56 06/29/2021 Declaration Affidavit View Document Declaration Affidavit Comment
  of Daniel Ehrlich
• 06/30/2021 Revision Judicial Officer
  Appel, George F Hearing Time
  9:15 AM Cancel Reason
  Defense/Respondent Requested Comment
  **As noted.-CONFIRMED/EHRLICH -STRICKEN/EHRLICH
• 06/30/2021 Hearing Cancelled Unknown Party
• 07/07/2021 Revision Judicial Officer
  Moore, Karen Hearing Time
  9:30 AM.Comment
  Oral Argument requested by Judge. Please appear at 9:30 am. -CONFIRMED/EHRLICH
• 57 07/07/2021 Motion Hearing View Document Motion Hearing Judicial Officer
  Moore, Karen
• 58 07/07/2021 Order Revising Ruling View Document Order Revising Ruling Comment
  order of default against Richard Heng dated 07/29/2019 and default judgment filed 09/01/2020 is vacated as to Richard Heng
• 59 07/09/2021 Release View Document Release Comment
  of writ ISSUED 2/11/21 TO WA STATE DSHS
• 60 10/18/2021 Note for Calendar View Document Note for Calendar
• 61 10/18/2021 Declaration of Mailing View Document Declaration of Mailing
• 62 10/18/2021 Affidavit in Support View Document Affidavit in Support Comment
  of Shean Nasin
• 63 10/18/2021 Affidavit in Support View Document Affidavit in Support Comment
  of Lisa McMahon-Myhran
• 64 10/18/2021 Declaration Affidavit View Document Declaration Affidavit Comment
  of Brett Masch
• 65 10/18/2021 Motion for Summary Judgment View Document Motion for Summary Judgment
• 66 11/03/2021 Note for Calendar View Document Note for Calendar
• 67 11/03/2021 Motion for Summary Judgment View Document Motion for Summary Judgment
• 68 11/03/2021 Affidavit in Support View Document Affidavit in Support Comment
  of Lisa McMahon-Myhran
• 69 11/03/2021 Affidavit in Support View Document Affidavit in Support Comment
  of Shean Nasin
• 70 11/03/2021 Affidavit in Support View Document Affidavit in Support Comment
  of Brett Masch
• 71 11/03/2021 Declaration of Mailing View Document Declaration of Mailing
• 72 11/10/2021 Motion and Affidavit Declaration View Document Motion and Affidavit Declaration Comment
  to Amend Case Caption & Amend Complaint
• 73 11/10/2021 Note for Calendar View Document Note for Calendar
• 74 11/10/2021 Declaration of Mailing View Document Declaration of Mailing
• 11/19/2021 Summary Judgment Judicial Officer
  Judge, Millie M Hearing Time
  9:30 AM Cancel Reason
  Stricken Comment
  – Masch
• 75 11/22/2021 Memorandum View Document MemorandumComment
  in Response to Motion for Summary Judgment
• 76 11/23/2021 Notice of Withdrawal of Attorney View Document Notice of Withdrawal of Attorney
• 77 11/29/2021 Notice of Withdrawal of Attorney View Document Notice of Withdrawal of Attorney Comment
  Amended
• 78 11/30/2021 Motion to Continue View Document Motion to Continue
• 79 11/30/2021 Order of Continuance View Document Order of Continuance Judicial Officer
  Moriarty, Patrick M
• 11/30/2021 Ex Parte Action With Order
• 12/01/2021 Motion Hearing Judicial Officer
  Moriarty, Patrick M Hearing Time
  10:30 AM Comment
  to Change Case Caption -CONFIRMED/MASCH
• 12/01/2021 Hearing Continued Stipulated Comment
  Continued to 12-22
• 80 12/03/2021 Note for Calendar View Document Note for Calendar
• 81 12/03/2021 Declaration of Mailing View Document Declaration of Mailing
• 82 12/03/2021 Note for Calendar View Document Note for Calendar Comment
  – Amended
• 83 12/03/2021 Declaration of Mailing View Document Declaration of Mailing
• 12/22/2021 Motion to Amend Judicial Officer
  Moriarty, Patrick M Hearing Time
  10:30 AM Cancel Reason
  Duplicate Hearing Comment
  caption
• 12/22/2021 Motion Hearing Judicial Officer
  Moriarty, Patrick M Hearing Time
  10:30 AM Comment
  to change case caption- CONFIRMED/MASCH
• 84 12/22/2021 Motion Hearing View Document Motion Hearing Judicial Officer
  Moriarty, Patrick M
• 85 12/22/2021 Order Granting Leave to Amend View Document Order Granting Leave to Amend Comment
  case caption & complaint
• 86 12/29/2021 Amended Summons View Document Amended Summons
• 87 12/29/2021 Declaration of Mailing View Document Declaration of Mailing
• 88 12/29/2021 Reply View Document Reply Comment
  to memorandum in response to motion for summary judgment
• 89 12/30/2021 Amended Complaint View Document Amended Complaint
• 90 01/04/2022 Response View Document ResponseComment
  to Motion for Summary Judgment
• 91 01/04/2022 Proposed Order Findings View Document Proposed Order Findings
• 92 01/04/2022 Notice of Appearance View Document Notice of Appearance
• 93 01/06/2022 Order of Continuance View Document Order of Continuance Judicial Officer
  Thompson, Paul W
• 01/06/2022 Ex Parte Action With Order
• 94 01/11/2022 Affidavit Declaration Certificate Confirmation of Service View Document Affidavit Declaration Certificate Confirmation of Service
• 95 01/18/2022 Note for Calendar View Document Note for Calendar Comment
  – Amended
• 96 01/18/2022 Declaration of Mailing View Document Declaration of Mailing
• 97 01/24/2022 Affidavit Declaration Certificate Confirmation of Service View Document Affidavit Declaration Certificate Confirmation of Service
• 98 02/04/2022 Note for Motion Docket Late Filing View Document Note for Motion Docket Late Filing Comment
  **Date passed, 03/30/21.
• 99 02/04/2022 Motion to Continue View Document Motion to Continue
• 100 02/04/2022 Proposed Order Findings View Document Proposed Order Findings
• 101 02/04/2022 Notice of Appearance View Document Notice of Appearance Comment
  – Amended
• 102 02/10/2022 Note for Calendar View Document Note for Calendar
• 103 02/15/2022 Note for Calendar View Document Note for Calendar Comment
  – Amended
• 104 02/15/2022 Declaration of Mailing View Document Declaration of Mailing
• 02/17/2022 Motion to Continue Judicial Officer
  Appel, George F Hearing Time
  9:15 AM Cancel Reason
  Stricken-Not Confirmed Comment
  Hearing from February 18, 2022 to March 18, 2022
• 02/17/2022 Hearing Cancelled Unknown Party
• 02/18/2022 Summary Judgment Judicial Officer
  Okrent, Richard T Hearing Time
  9:30 AM Cancel Reason
  Duplicate Hearing Comment
  – Masch
• 105 03/14/2022 Reply View Document ReplyComment
  to Response to Motion for Summary Judgment
• 106 03/14/2022 Declaration of Mailing View Document Declaration of Mailing
• 107 03/14/2022 Notice of Intent to Withdraw View Document Notice of Intent to Withdraw
• 03/18/2022 Summary Judgment Judicial Officer
  Moore, Karen Hearing Time
  9:30 AM Comment
  /Masch -CONT 12/3/21 PER MASCH – CONT 01/07 PER MASCH -CONT FROM 2/18/22 PER MASCH-CONFIRMED/MASCH Oral argument requested by Court
• 108 03/18/2022 Summary Judgment Hearing View Document Summary Judgment Hearing Judicial Officer
  Moore, Karen
• 109 03/18/2022 Order Denying Motion Petition View Document Order Denying Motion Petition Comment
  for Summary Judgment ***VACATED 04/08/2022***
• 110 03/28/2022 Motion for Reconsideration View Document Motion for Reconsideration
• 111 03/28/2022 Note for Calendar View Document Note for Calendar
• 112 03/28/2022 Declaration of Mailing View Document Declaration of Mailing
• 04/08/2022 Motion Hearing Judicial Officer
  Moore, Karen Hearing Time
  9:30 AM Comment
  Motion for Reconsideration
• 113 04/08/2022 Motion View Document MotionComment
  for Extension of Time
• 114 04/08/2022 Motion Hearing View Document Motion Hearing Judicial Officer
  Moore, Karen
• 115 04/08/2022 Order on Motion for Reconsideration View Document Order on Motion for Reconsideration Comment
  /granted, vacating order entered 03/18/2022 and granting pltfs motion for summary judgment
• 04/08/2022 Case Resolution Summary Judgment
• 116 04/19/2022 Motion for Reconsideration View Document Motion for Reconsideration
• 117 04/19/2022 Motion for Reconsideration View Document Motion for Reconsideration Comment
  of Summary Judgment
• 118 05/02/2022 Note for Calendar View Document Note for Calendar
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  of Summary Judgment-Amended
• 05/06/2022 Reconsideration Judicial Officer
  Moore, Karen Hearing Time
  10:00 AM Comment
  Motion for Reconsideration (w/o Oral Arg)
• 120 05/16/2022 Order on Motion for Reconsideration View Document Order on Motion for Reconsideration Judicial Officer
  Moore, Karen Comment
  denied
• 05/16/2022 Ex Parte Action With Order
• 121 05/27/2022 Motion for Reconsideration View Document Motion for Reconsideration
• 122 05/27/2022 Writ of Garnishment View Document Writ of Garnishment
• 123 06/09/2022 Note for Calendar View Document Note for Calendar
• 06/17/2022 Reconsideration Judicial Officer
  Moore, Karen Hearing Time
  9:00 AM Comment
  2nd motion
• 124 06/17/2022 Motion for Reconsideration View Document Motion for Reconsideration Comment
  /amended second
• 125 06/17/2022 Motion Hearing View Document Motion HearingJudicial Officer
  Moore, Karen
• 126 06/24/2022 Answer to Writ View Document Answer to Writ
• 127 06/28/2022 Order on Motion for Reconsideration View Document Order on Motion for ReconsiderationJudicial Officer
  Moore, KarenComment
  -Denied
• 06/28/2022 Ex Parte Action With Order

Kiona Park Estates v. Dehls

Court of Appeals of Washington, Division Two

April 6, 2021, Oral Argument; July 7, 2021, Filed

No. 54477-6-IIReporter
18 Wn. App. 2d 328 | 491 P.3d 247 | 2021 Wash. App. LEXIS 1665

Kiona Park Estates, Respondent, v. Avera Lee Dehls et al., Appellants.

Prior History:

Appeal from Lewis County Superior Court. Docket No: 18-2-01287-1. Judge signing: Honorable J Andrew Toynbee. Judgment or order under review. Date filed: 01/08/2020.

Headnotes/Summary

Summary
WASHINGTON OFFICIAL REPORTS SUMMARY

Nature of Action: A homeowners’ association sued a member for damages and foreclosure on all past liens and past due balances owing on dues assessments unpaid since 2002.

Superior Court: The Superior Court for Lewis County, No. 18-2-01287-1, J. Andrew Toynbee, J., on January 8, 2020, entered a summary judgment in favor of the association.

Court of Appeals: Holding that (1) the action was subject to the six-year limitation period of RCW 4.16.040, (2) each annual dues assessment was a discreet claim, and (3) the association was therefore entitled to collect unpaid dues only from 2013 to 2018, the court reverses the judgment and remands the case for further proceedings.

Counsel:Christi C. Goeller, for appellants.

Kelly A. Delaat-Maher (of Smith Alling PS), for respondent.

Judges: Authored by Lisa Sutton. Concurring: Lisa Worswick, Linda Lee.

Opinion by: Lisa Sutton

Opinion

¶1 Sutton, J. — Avera Dehls appeals the superior court’s judgment and order granting summary judgment to the Kiona Park Estates Association (Association) to enforce a recorded lien for Dehls’s unpaid annual homeowners’ association (HOA) dues from 2002 to 2018. This case presents an issue of first impression: which statute of limitations applies to an action to enforce a HOA’s lien where chapter 64.38 RCW, the governing chapter for HOAs, does not contain a limitations period.

¶2 We hold that the applicable statute of limitations is six years under RCW 4.16.040 because the governing documents are written agreements. We further hold that each annual HOA dues assessment is a discrete claim. Accordingly, based on the six-year limitations period, the Association is entitled to collect unpaid dues from Dehls for only the time period 2013 to 2018. Thus, we hold that the superior court erred by granting the Association summary judgment for the entire amount of unpaid dues from 2003 to 2018. We reverse the court’s judgment and order granting summary judgment, and we remand to the superior court to vacate the judgment and order and to enter an amended judgment and order consistent with this opinion.

FACTS

I. Background Facts

¶3 The Association is a Washington nonprofit corporation. It was formed to, among other things, collect dues and assessments from its membership and to enforce the covenants and restrictions in a development known as Kiona Park Estates.

¶4 The Association’s governing documents are the original “Declaration of Protective Covenants and Easements,” the 1986 “Restated Declaration of Protective Covenants and Easements” (collectively Declarations), and the “Articles of Incorporation”; the Restated Declaration has been amended during the relevant time period.1 Articles C and D of the Declarations grant authority to the Association to assess dues against each member of the Association for maintenance, and provide that any unpaid dues become a lien. The dues are required to be paid in January of each year. The dues amount was $150 per year in 2002, $200 per year from 2003 to 2017, and $250 per year beginning in 2018.

¶5 Section C(2)(a) of the Declarations states, in relevant part, “Any dues that remain unpaid for a period of ninety (90) days shall become a lien against the defaulting lot owner’s property enforceable as any other real estate lien in the State of Washington.” Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 85, 98, 115. The Association’s Articles of Incorporation state, “Delinquent dues and assessments will constitute a lien upon the parcel(s) of real property owned by the delinquent member of the corporation,” consistent with the provisions of the Declarations. CP at 133. Article E, section 2 states that the “parties in interest” have the right to enforce the Declarations. CP at 60, 72, 99-100. Association bylaws adopted in 2001 and amended in 2017 also support the HOA’s right and ability to assess an owner for dues and take enforcement action against an owner for unpaid dues in the form of a lien or collection.

¶6 Dehls purchased real property in the Kiona Park Estates development in 1989 and is a member of the Association. Since 2001, Dehls has failed to make payments to the Association as required by the Declarations, and he became delinquent beginning in January 2002. The Association filed and recorded liens against Dehls’s property in 2003, 2006, and 2018. The 2003 lien was for dues owed for 2002 and 2003. The 2006 lien referred only to dues owed in 2004 and 2005, as well as attorney fees. The 2018 lien aggregated all the dues Dehls owed beginning in 2002, stating that Dehls was “in arrears of annual membership dues and assessments, interest, and/or late charges in the amount of $10,041.67,” plus attorney fees in the amount of $368.02, for a total owed of $10,409.69. CP at 38.

II. Procedural Facts

¶7 The Association filed a complaint against Dehls in November 2018, seeking damages and foreclosure on all the past liens and past due balances. Dehls answered the complaint and asserted the affirmative defense of statute of limitations.

¶8 In June 2019, the Association filed a motion for summary judgment and argued that Dehls breached his duties under the Declarations. In support of its motion, the Association filed declarations from its attorney, treasurer, and president. The Association filed, among other documents, the Declarations in their current and past versions, the Articles of Incorporation, and the Association’s ledger outlining the amounts Dehls owed plus interest accrued, for a total amount due of $7,101.00. Dehls opposed this motion and argued that the Association could not collect the past dues from 2002 because the Declarations are contracts and, thus, the 6-year statute of limitations under RCW 4.16.040 applied. The Association replied that it was not subject to a 6-year statute of limitations because the Declarations and Articles of Incorporation were not “contracts,” but either were more akin to an open account under RCW 4.16.150 or were subject to a 10-year statute of limitations under RCW 4.16.120.

¶9 The superior court granted the Association’s motion for summary judgment. The court awarded the Association $7,101.00 for past dues, as well as $7,143.74 in attorney fees and $1,046.00 in costs. Dehls filed a motion for reconsideration, which the superior court denied.

¶10 Dehls appeals the superior court’s judgment and order granting the Association’s motion for summary judgment and denying Dehls’s motion for reconsideration.

ANALYSIS

I. Summary Judgment

¶11 Dehls argues that the superior court erred by granting the Association’s motion for summary judgment because the Declarations constitute a contract or written agreement and, thus, the six-year statute of limitations under RCW 4.16.040 applies, barring the Association’s claim to enforce liens prior to 2013. We hold that the six-year statute of limitations in RCW 4.16.040 applies because the debt arose from the Declarations, which are written agreements. Thus, the superior court erred by granting summary judgment in the Association’s favor for dues owed for the period of 2002 to 2012.

A. Legal Principles

1. Summary Judgment

¶12 We review summary judgment decisions de novo. Zonnebloem, LLC v. Blue Bay Holdings, LLC, 200 Wn. App. 178, 182, 401 P.3d 468 (2017). Summary judgment is appropriate where the pleadings, admissions on file, and affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. CR 56(c). Here, the materials facts are undisputed.

2. Governing Documents

¶13 An HOA’s governing documents are interpreted in accordance with accepted rules of contract interpretation. See Bangerter v. Hat Island Cmty. Ass’n, 14 Wn. App. 2d 718, 735, 472 P.3d 998 (2020), review granted, 196 Wn.2d 1037 (2021); see also RCW 64.38.010(10). Contract interpretation is a question of law that we review de novo. Dave Johnson Ins., Inc. v. Wright, 167 Wn. App. 758, 769, 275 P.3d 339 (2012). “The purpose of contract interpretation is to determine the parties’ intent.” Roats v. Blakely Island Maint. Comm’n, Inc., 169 Wn. App. 263, 274, 279 P.3d 943 (2012). Washington courts follow the context rule of contract interpretation, which allows a court, while viewing the contract as a whole, to consider extrinsic evidence to determine the parties’ intent. Roats, 169 Wn. App. at 274. We consider a corporation’s governing documents, including articles of incorporation and bylaws, “correlated documents” to be construed together as a whole. Roats, 169 Wn. App. at 274.

¶14 Contractual language generally must be given its ordinary, usual, and popular meaning. Jensen v. Lake Jane Estates, 165 Wn. App. 100, 105, 267 P.3d 435 (2011). “An interpretation of a contract that gives effect to all provisions is favored over an interpretation that renders a provision ineffective.” Snohomish County Pub. Transp. Benefit Area Corp. v. FirstGroup Am., Inc., 173 Wn.2d 829, 840, 271 P.3d 850 (2012). And “[w]here one construction would make a contract unreasonable, and another, equally consistent with its language, would make it reasonable, the latter more rational construction must prevail.” Byrne v. Ackerlund, 108 Wn.2d 445, 453-54, 739 P.2d 1138 (1987). Here, the relevant governing documents are the Declarations as amended.

3. Restrictive Covenants

¶15 Dehls argues that the governing documents constitute a restrictive covenant. A “restrictive covenant” is an agreement or promise between two or more parties that limits permissible uses of land. See Hollis v. Garwall, Inc., 137 Wn.2d 683, 690, 974 P.2d 836 (1999); Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes § 1.3, at 23 (Am. Law Inst. 2000). When the covenant “runs with the land,” it burdens a particular parcel with the duty of complying with the restriction and benefits of a particular parcel with the right to enforce the restriction. Deep Water Brewing, LLC v. Fairway Res. Ltd., 152 Wn. App. 229, 257-58, 215 P.3d 990 (2009); 17 William B. Stoebuck & John W. Weaver, Washington Practice: Real Estate: Property Law § 3.2 (2d ed. 2004). “The doctrine of ‘running’ is analogous to the contract doctrines of assignment of rights and delegation of duties; it is a doctrine whereby remote parties are bound or benefited by contractual covenants made by the original parties.” 17 Stoebuck & Weaver, supra, § 3.2, at 126.

¶16 Between the original parties to the covenant, enforcement is a matter of contract law. Deep Water Brewing, 152 Wn. App. at 257. If the covenant runs with the land, it may also be enforced by the original parties’ successors in interest. Deep Water Brewing, 152 Wn. App. at 257-58.

4. Statute of Limitations and Accrual of an Action

¶17 A statute of limitations is designed to protect individuals and courts from stale claims. Burns v. McClinton, 135 Wn. App. 285, 293, 143 P.3d 630 (2006). As an affirmative defense, the statute of limitations is a matter on which the defendant bears the burden of proof. See Haslund v. City of Seattle, 86 Wn.2d 607, 620-21, 547 P.2d 1221 (1976). Where the underlying facts are not in dispute, whether a case was filed within the statute of limitations period is a question of law to be determined by a judge. Goodman v. Goodman, 128 Wn.2d 366, 373, 907 P.2d 290 (1995). We review questions of law de novo. Filmore LLLP v. Unit Owners Ass’n of Centre Pointe Condo., 184 Wn.2d 170, 173, 355 P.3d 1128 (2015).

¶18 HOAs are governed by chapter 64.38 RCW. However, the legislature has imposed no statute of limitations to dictate actions arising out of this chapter. In contrast, the legislature imposed a three-year statute of limitations for actions arising out of the Condominium Act,2 and later imposed a six-year statute of limitations for actions arising out of the Washington Uniform Common Interest Ownership Act.3 RCW 64.34.364(8); RCW 64.90.485(9).

¶19 RCW 4.16.040(1) states that “[a]n action upon a contract in writing, or liability express or implied arising out of a written agreement” has a six-year statute of limitations. “A cause of action generally accrues for purposes of the commencement of the statute of limitation when a party has a right to apply to court for relief.” Bush v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am., 23 Wn. App. 327, 329, 596 P.2d 1357 (1979).

B. Analysis

¶20 It is undisputed that the Declarations are the governing HOA documents. Accordingly, the governing documents are interpreted via contract rules. See Bangerter, 14 Wn. App. 2d at 735; RCW 64.38.010(10). And the parties’ intent was that members of the Association would pay dues in order to receive the benefit of certain maintenance and easements. Roats, 169 Wn. App. at 274. This is clear from the plain meaning of the contractual language. Jensen, 165 Wn. App. at 105. The Association, as the HOA, sued Dehls to enforce the Declarations, which are written agreements. Because this action arises out of a written agreement—the Declarations—RCW 4.16.040 applies, and the statute of limitations to enforce an HOA lien or unpaid HOA dues is six years.

¶21 The Association argues that RCW 4.16.020 applies. RCW 4.16.020 establishes a 10-year statute of limitations for recovery of an interest in real property. This does not apply here because it was not an action for recovery of an interest in real property. The Association does not seek to recover Dehls’s property; rather, it seeks only to recover the dues owed to it by Dehls.

¶22 The Association also argues that RCW 4.16.150, which deals with open and mutual accounts, applies. RCW 4.16.150 provides:

In an action brought to recover a balance due upon a mutual open and current account, where there have been reciprocal demands between the parties, the cause of action shall be deemed to have accrued from the time of the last item proved in the account on either side, but whenever a period of more than one year shall have elapsed between any of a series of items or demands, they are not to be deemed such an account.

“An open account is one in which some item of contract is not settled by the parties. Typically, the account results from ongoing sales of goods, supplies, or materials, but may also result from ongoing rendition of services or advancement of money, comprising mutual credits between the parties.” 27 Marjorie Dick Rombauer, Washington Practice: Creditors’ Remedies—Debtors’ Relief § 5.47, at 522-23 (1998) (footnote omitted). And “[a]n account is not mutual if it consists of items provided on separate contracts without reciprocal demands.” 27 Rombauer, at 523 n.7 (citing Hills v. City of Hoquiam, 94 Wash. 63, 161 P. 1049 (1916)).

¶23 RCW 4.16.150 does not apply here because Dehls’s unpaid dues are not an open and mutual account. This was not a matter of a contract remaining unsettled by a party. Rather, each yearly dues assessment was a discrete amount owed to the Association. The dues assessment was due on a yearly basis, and the amount of the dues periodically increased. The dues owed each year were for services to be provided by the Association in the coming year.

¶24 Articles C and D of the Declarations provide for common expenses owed by each member of the Association annually, and any unpaid expenses become a lien. The dues are due each year in January. In 2002, the dues were $150 per year, and from 2003 to 2017, the dues were $200 per year. The dues went up to $250 per year beginning in 2018. Discrete annual dues amounts were due 90 days after each year’s dues were assessed; on the 91st day, the cause of action accrued and the statute of limitations began to run on each discrete dues assessment.

¶25 Dehls does not dispute that the Association had the authority through the governing documents to seek enforcement of the 2013 to 2018 dues. Since 2002, Dehls never paid his annual dues, and the Association filed and recorded three liens against his property in 2003, 2006, and 2018. At the time the Association filed this lawsuit in 2018, Dehls’s dues totaled $7,101.00, plus interest accrued from 2003 on. But because the six-year statute of limitations began to run each year on the 91st day after Dehls received his dues statement, the Association can seek enforcement of the unpaid annual dues only for the years 2013 through 2018.

¶26 Therefore, the superior court erred by granting summary judgment to the Association in regard to the 2002-2012 dues, but it properly granted summary judgment to the Association in regard to the 2013-2018 unpaid dues. Accordingly, we reverse and remand to the superior court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

II. Appellate Attorney Fees and Costs

¶27 Both parties argue that they are entitled to an award of reasonable appellate attorney fees and costs. Because neither party can be perceived as the prevailing party on appeal, we deny both parties’ requests.

¶28 RAP 18.1(a) authorizes a party to recover reasonable attorney fees and expenses so long as the party “request[s] the fees or expenses” and “applicable law grants to [the] party the right to recover.” The party must do so in a separate section of his or her opening brief. RAP 18.1(b). We will award attorney fees to the prevailing party “only on the basis of a private agreement, a statute, or a recognized ground of equity.” Equitable Life Leasing Corp. v. Cedarbrook, Inc., 52 Wn. App. 497, 506, 761 P.2d 77 (1988). “When both parties to an action are afforded some measure of relief and there is no singularly prevailing party,” neither party is entitled to attorney fees. Marine Enters., Inc. v. Sec. Pac. Trading Corp., 50 Wn. App. 768, 772, 750 P.2d 1290 (1988).

¶29 The Declarations provide a right to attorney fees and costs to the prevailing party in any legal actions. Because there is no prevailing party on appeal, we deny both parties’ requests for attorney fees and costs on appeal.

CONCLUSION

¶30 We reverse the court’s judgment and order granting summary judgment, and we remand to the superior court to vacate the judgment and order and enter an amended judgment and order consistent with this opinion.

Lee, C.J., and Worswick, J., concur.

References

LexisNexis Practice Guide: Washington Real Estate Litigation

Washington Rules of Court Annotated (LexisNexis ed.)

Annotated Revised Code of Washington by LexisNexisFootnotes

• 1We consider a corporation’s governing documents, including articles of incorporation and bylaws, “correlated documents” to be construed together as a whole. Roats v. Blakely Island Maint. Comm’n, Inc., 169 Wn. App. 263, 274, 279 P.3d 943 (2012).
• 2Ch. 64.34 RCW.
• 3Ch. 64.90 RCW.