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In Flanagan v. Flanagan (2002)27 Cal.4th 766 , — Cal.Rptr.2d –; — P.3d –[No. S085594. Mar. 14, 2002.] a tawdry tale of love, betrayal, impatient greed, and deceit unfolds as a loyal husband, mortician, and business success is rewarded with an attempt on his life by his darling wife. A ready made movie script is revealed in this California Appellate Court opinion:

Opinion by J. Kennard.

California prohibits the recording of a telephone call without consent from all parties, but only if the call includes a “confidential communication.” (Pen. Code, § 632, subd. (a).) fn. 1 Violation of the law is a misdemeanor (ibid.) and may entail a civil penalty of $5,000 or three times the actual damages, whichever is greater (§ 637.2). Our Courts of Appeal have disagreed over the meaning of the critical term “confidential communication.” We granted review to resolve that disagreement.

One line of authority holds that a conversation is confidential if a party to that conversation has an objectively reasonable expectation that the conversation is not being overheard or recorded. (Frio v. Superior Court (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 1480 (Frio); Coulter v. Bank of America (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 923.) Under the other line of authority, a conversation is confidential only if the party has an objectively reasonable expectation that the content will not later be divulged to third parties. (O’Laskey v. Sortino (1990) 224 Cal.App.3d 241 (O’Laskey); see Deteresa v. American Broadcasting Companies, Inc. (9th Cir. 1997) 121 F.3d 460(Deteresa).) We endorse the standard established in Frio and Coulter.

I. THE CALIFORNIA PRIVACY ACT The California Invasion of Privacy Act (§ 630 et seq.) was enacted in 1967, replacing prior laws that permitted the recording of telephone conversations with the consent of one party to the conversation. (See [27 Cal.4th 769] Electronic Surveillance in California (1969) 57 Cal. L.Rev. 1182, 1191.) The purpose of the act was to protect the right of privacy by, among other things, requiring that all parties consent to a recording of their conversation.

This case involves subdivisions (a) and (c) of section 632. Subdivision (a) provides: “Every person who, intentionally and without the consent of all parties to a confidential communication . . . eavesdrops upon or records the confidential communication, whether the communication is carried on among the parties in the presence of one another or by means of telegraph, telephone, or other device, except a radio, shall be punished by a fine not exceeding [$2,500] or imprisonment . . . not exceeding one year. . . .” (Italics added.)

Subdivision (c) of section 632 addresses the term “confidential communication.” It states: “The term ‘confidential communication’ includes any communication carried on in circumstances as may reasonably indicate that any party to the communication desires it to be confined to the parties thereto, but excludes a communication made in a public gathering or in any legislative, judicial, executive or administrative proceeding open to the public, or in any other circumstance in which the parties to the communication may reasonably expect that the communication may be overheard or recorded.” (Ibid., italics added.)

II. THE FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND [1] Because this is an appeal from a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, we state the facts in the light most favorable to the verdict. (Quintal v. Laurel Grove Hospital (1964) 62 Cal.2d 154, 159.)

John and Honorine T. Flanagan married in 1969. John had two children from a prior marriage — J. Michael (Michael) and Carol. He had also adopted Terri Ann, Honorine’s daughter from a previous marriage. At the time of the marriage, John was a successful businessman who owned and operated several mortuaries in Southern California. His estate was valued to be at least $22 million.

In 1992, after John had been diagnosed with prostate cancer, his physician prescribed medication to slow the spread of the cancer. In 1993, Honorine began to give John his prescribed monthly injections.

Under John’s 1990 estate plan, upon his death Honorine would receive all his property for life, with a power of appointment over the remainder. In [27 Cal.4th 770] default of appointment, the property would go to Terri Ann. In April 1995, John and Honorine amended the trust to give his grandchildren (Michael’s and Carol’s children) a remainder interest in his share of the property, but they did not provide anything for Michael or Carol directly.

Sometime in the spring of 1995, Honorine told her manicurist, Dale Denels, that she would pay $100,000 for someone to kill John. In September 1995, Honorine told Denels that she was injecting John with water instead of medicine. Denels began taping her telephone conversations with Honorine.

In March 1996, Denels told Michael that John’s life was in danger and she played a tape recording of one of her conversations with Honorine. Michael then met with John and played the tape for him. John moved out of the home he shared with Honorine and moved in with Michael. Soon thereafter he was taken to the University of Southern California’s Norris Cancer Clinic. The clinic physician prescribed increased medication, which led to a dramatic decline in the blood marker measuring the spread of John’s cancer. This led the physician to conclude that John had not been receiving the prescribed medication during the months before his arrival at the clinic.

John changed his will to divide all his property between Carol and Michael, excluding Honorine and her daughter. In April 1996, he filed for dissolution of the marriage and termination of the trust established by his previous estate plan.

In August 1996, however, John and Honorine reconciled. John returned to the family residence and executed a new estate plan leaving Michael and Carol $150,000 each, with Honorine and Terri Ann receiving the balance of the estate. This was the plan in effect on March 19, 1997, when John died of cardiovascular disease unrelated to his prostate cancer.

Honorine filed this lawsuit against Michael and manicurist Denels, alleging conspiracy, invasion of privacy, and infliction of emotional distress. Honorine alleged Denels violated section 632 by recording her telephone conversations with Honorine without the latter’s consent. Michael cross-complained, alleging that after John’s return to the family home in the summer of 1996, Honorine, without Michael’s knowledge or consent, taped all of Michael’s telephone conversations with John.

The case went to trial in 1998. In the first part of a bifurcated trial, the jury rejected all counts of Honorine’s complaint against Michael and Denels. It then heard the evidence on Michael’s cross-complaint against Honorine.

Honorine testified that she installed a voice-activated tape recorder either at the end of 1995 or the beginning of 1996. She said that she installed the [27 Cal.4th 771] machine with John’s consent and that she did not know her conduct might be illegal. She listened to the tapes daily, keeping those she considered useful and recording over the remainder. She based her suit against Michael partly on the communications on the tapes.

Relying on telephone company records, Michael testified that Honorine had recorded 27 telephone calls between him and his father. He placed nine calls from a cellular phone. fn. 2Some of the cellular phone calls appeared to be redials when a connection was lost.

Michael introduced into evidence the tapes of three of the telephone calls. He described some of the other calls: one was to get directions to a place where he was to meet with John, four were to remind John to notify the gatekeeper that Michael was coming to visit, and two were to confirm the times and places for meetings. Michael testified that Honorine had forbidden John to speak with him, and Michael considered all of his conversations with his father to be confidential. He did not know his calls were being recorded.

The jury found that 24 calls were confidential fn. 3 and awarded Michael $5,000 for each call, for a total of $120,000, plus punitive damages of $1.2 million. On Honorine’s motion for a new trial or for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, the trial court limited Michael’s statutory damages to $5,000 and struck the punitive damages award. The court reasoned that multiple conversations involving the same subject should be considered a single violation, and that absent proof of actual damages in excess of the statutory civil penalty of $5,000 (§ 637.2), the constitutional prohibition against excessive fines (see Hale v. Morgan (1978) 22 Cal.3d 388) limited Michael’s general damages to $5,000. Michael appealed.

The Court of Appeal rejected both the trial court’s reasoning that constitutional principles limited damages to $5,000, and Honorine’s contention that the statute should be construed to provide a single $5,000 award per victim irrespective of the number of recorded conversations. It held that two of the three conversations played to the jury were confidential, but that [27 Cal.4th 772] because Michael had presented no evidence of the specific content of the remaining conversations, he had failed to prove they were also confidential. It therefore found Michael was entitled to statutory damages of $5,000 for each of the two confidential conversations, for a total of $10,000. Finally, it held that the statute’s provision for treble damages excluded recovery of punitive damages.

Michael petitioned this court for review, raising only the conflict in certain Court of Appeal decisions concerning the definition of the phrase “confidential communication” under section 632. He did not question whether section 632 excluded punitive damages. Honorine did not petition for review. Thus, the matter before us is limited to interpreting the phrase “confidential communication” in section 632 and does not include other issues raised in the Court of Appeal.

 III. PRIOR DECISIONS CONSTRUING SECTION 632

 As noted earlier, some decisions of our Courts of Appeal have arrived at conflicting definitions of confidentiality. Frio, supra, 203 Cal.App.3d 1480, was the first decision to address directly the meaning of “confidential communication” in section 632. During discovery in an action for breach of contract, Richard Frio acknowledged that he had tape-recorded some telephone conversations. He took notes based on the tapes, then rerecorded over the tapes. In a pretrial ruling, the court barred Frio from introducing his notes into evidence, citing section 632, subdivision (d), which provides that “[e]xcept as proof in an action or prosecution for violation of this section, no evidence obtained as a result of eavesdropping upon or recording a confidential communication in violation of this section shall be admissible . . . .” Frio sought pretrial review by petitioning the Court of Appeal for a writ of mandate.

The Court of Appeal observed that “[t]he legislative history of section 632 reveals the Legislature’s intent to strengthen then existing law by ‘prohibiting wiretapping or “electronic eavesdropping” without the consent of all parties to the communication which is being tapped or overheard.’ [Citations.]” (Frio, supra, 203 Cal.App.3d at p. 1487, italics omitted.) Viewing the test of confidentiality as “an objective one defined in terms of reasonableness” (id. at p. 1488) the court reasoned that the nature of Frio’s business and the character of the communications showed that the parties would not expect their communications to be simultaneously disseminated to an unannounced second auditor (id. at pp. 1489-1490). The court then stated what has become known as the “Frio test”: “under section 632 ‘confidentiality’ appears to require nothing more than the existence of a [27 Cal.4th 773]reasonable expectation by one of the parties that no one is ‘listening in’ or overhearing the conversation.” (Id. at p. 1490, italics added.)

In O’Laskey, supra, 224 Cal.App.3d 241, however, the Court of Appeal set out a competing standard. Phillip O’Laskey sought to oppose Mike Sortino’s summary judgment motion, based on the statute of limitations, by producing a tape recording of a telephone conversation in which Sortino admitted that he had stayed outside the State of California for two weeks. If the statute were tolled during this period, O’Laskey’s complaint would have been timely. After reviewing cases discussing reasonable expectations of privacy in criminal and civil contexts, the O’Laskey court said: “[W]e distill from this comparison the basic rule that the statute means what it says — and we thus examine whether Sortino reasonably expected, under the circumstances of the investigator’s call, that the conversation would not be divulged to any one else.” (Id. at p. 248, italics added.) The Court of Appeal concluded that the call was not confidential because Sortino would expect the content of the call to be revealed to other persons. (Id. at pp. 248-249.)

Four years later the Court of Appeal in Coulter v. Bank of America, supra, 28 Cal.App.4th 923, followed the Frio standard. Christopher Coulter, a bank employee who had complained of harassment, secretly recorded his conversations with 11 other employees. Appealing a summary judgment against him, Coulter claimed the conversations were not confidential because he believed the parties knew the substance of the discussion would be passed on to others at the bank. Citing Frio, the court in Coulter responded that whether “the subject matter might be later discussed has no bearing on whether section 632 is violated.” (Id. at p. 929.)

Thereafter, in 1997, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in a case applying California law, followed the O’Laskey standard in Deteresa, supra, 121 F.3d 460. Beverly Deteresa was a flight attendant on the flight that O. J. Simpson, a suspect in the murders of Nicole Simpson and Ronald Goldman, took from Los Angeles to Chicago. Anthony Radziwill, a producer for defendant American Broadcasting Corporation (ABC), interviewed Deteresa about appearing on a television show. Unknown to her, he recorded the conversation. When she later declined to appear on the show, ABC used the recorded conversation in its television program. After examining the pertinent California decisions and finding them in conflict, the Ninth Circuit had to predict how our court would resolve that conflict in state authority, and it did so: “[W]e predict that the California Supreme Court would adopt theO’Laskey standard, not the Frio standard.” (121 F.3d at p. 464.) Applying the O’Laskey test, the Ninth Circuit held that the conversation between Deteresa and Radziwill was not confidential because [27 Cal.4th 774] “no one in Deteresa’s shoes could reasonably expect that a reporter would not divulge her account . . . .” (Id. at p. 465.)

The case before us here illustrates the difference between the two standards. Under the Friotest, Michael could prove that his conversations with his father were confidential simply by showing that he had an objectively reasonable expectation that they were not being recorded. Under the O’Laskey test, he would also have to prove the content of each conversation, and show that he had an objectively reasonable expectation that no one would divulge that content to a third party.

IV. THE DEFINITION OF “CONFIDENTIAL COMMUNICATION” IN SECTION 632

[2a] Section 632, subdivision (c), has two clauses. The first clause states that ” ‘confidential communication’ includes any communication carried on in circumstances that may reasonably indicate that any party to the communication desires it to be confined to the parties thereto”; the second clause “excludes a communication made in a public gathering or in any legislative, judicial, executive or administrative proceeding open to the public, or in any other circumstance in which the parties to the communication may reasonably expect that the communication may be overheard or recorded.” (Italics added.)

O’Laskey’s conclusion that a conversation is confidential only if a party has an objectively reasonable expectation that its content will not be disseminated to others does not conform with the import of the first clause. [3] “Includes” is “ordinarily a term of enlargement rather than limitation.” (Ornelas v. Randolph (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1095, 1101.) The “statutory definition of a thing as ‘including’ certain things does not necessarily place thereon a meaning limited to the inclusions.” (People v. Western Air Lines, Inc. (1954) 42 Cal.2d 621, 639.) [2b] Thus theO’Laskey standard, under which the phrase “confidential communication” not only includes but is limited to conversations whose content is to be kept secret does not conform to the inclusive language of section 632, subdivision (c). This incompatibility disappears, however, if the phrase “confined to the parties” in the first clause of subdivision (c) is interpreted to refer to the actual conversation, not its content. So construed, the first clause includes within the statutory protection any conversation under circumstances showing that a party desires it not to be overheard or recorded. The second clause then excludes a conversation under circumstances where the party reasonably believes it will be overheard or recorded. Under this construction, the two clauses of section 632 do not conflict nor [27 Cal.4th 775] leave any uncertainty; they act together in harmony to prohibit unconsented-to eavesdropping or recording of conversations regardless of whether the party expects that the content of the conversation may later be conveyed to a third party.

This construction of section 632 draws support from our discussion of the California Invasion of Privacy Act in Ribas v. Clark (1985) 38 Cal.3d 355 (Ribas). Ribas explained: “In enacting [the Privacy Act], the Legislature declared in broad terms its intent ‘to protect the right of privacy of the people of this state’ from what it perceived as ‘a serious threat to the free exercise of personal liberties [that] cannot be tolerated in a free and civilized society.’ (Pen. Code, § 630.) This philosophy appears to lie at the heart of virtually all the decisions construing the Privacy Act.” (38 Cal.3d at p. 359.)

Ribas also drew a critical distinction between eavesdropping upon or recording a conversation and later disseminating its contents. We explained: “While one who imparts private information risks the betrayal of his confidence by the other party, a substantial distinction has been recognized between the secondhand repetition of the contents of a conversation and its simultaneous dissemination to an unannounced second auditor, whether that auditor be a person or a mechanical device.” (Ribas, supra, 35 Cal.3d at pp. 360-361.) We repeated that language in Shulman v. Group W Production, Inc. (1998) 18 Cal.4th 200, 234, and Sanders v. American Broadcasting Companies (1999) 20 Cal.4th 907, 915.

By focusing on “simultaneous dissemination,” not “secondhand repetition” (Ribas, supra, 35 Cal.3d at p. 360), the Frio definition of “confidential communication” that we here endorse better fulfills the legislative purpose of the Privacy Act by giving greater protection to privacy interests than does the O’Laskey standard. The latter protects against recording or eavesdropping only if a party seeks to keep the content of the conversation secret.

We also find support for the Frio definition of “confidential communication” in the actions of the Legislature when it amended the Privacy Act to take account of privacy issues raised by the increased use of cellular and cordless telephones. (See § 632.5, added by Stats. 1985, ch. 909, § 3, p. 2902; § 632.6, added by Stats. 1990, ch. 696, § 4, p. 3269; § 632.7, added by Stats. 1992, ch. 298, § 6, p. 1216.) In enacting the first of these amendments, the Legislature found that “the advent of widespread use of cellular radio telephone technology means that persons will be conversing over a network which cannot guarantee privacy in the same way that it is guaranteed over landline systems.” (Stats. 1985, ch. 909, § 2, p. 2900; similar [27 Cal.4th 776] language as to cordless telephones appears in Stats. 1990, ch. 696, § 2, p. 3268.) Responding to the problem of protecting the privacy of parties to calls involving cellular or cordless telephones, the Legislature prohibited the malicious interception of calls from or to cellular or cordless phones (§§ 632.5, 632.6) and the intentional interception or recording of a communication involving a cellular phone or a cordless phone (§ 632.7).

Significantly, those statutes protect against interception or recording of any communication. When the Legislature determined that there was no practical means of protecting cordless and cellular phone conversations from accidental eavesdropping, it chose to protect all such conversations from malicious or intentional eavesdropping or recording, rather than protecting only conversations where a party wanted to keep the content secret. The scope of this prohibition indicates, as we suggested in Ribas, supra, 35 Cal.3d at pages 360-361, that the Legislature’s ongoing concern is with eavesdropping or recording of conversations, not later dissemination. It would be anomalous to interpret the Privacy Act as protecting all cellular or cordless phone conversations, but only those landline conversations that the parties intended to keep secret — especially because, as here, many conversations take place between persons using different types of telephones.

Under the construction adopted here, the Privacy Act is a coherent statutory scheme. It protects against intentional, nonconsensual recording of telephone conversations regardless of the content of the conversation or the type of telephone involved. In contrast, the O’Laskeystandard urged by Honorine and adopted by the Court of Appeal would provide significantly less protection from surreptitious eavesdropping or recording when both telephones are landline telephones, a distinction that lacks any justification in terms of the purpose of the privacy act. fn. 4

 V. DISPOSITION OF THE APPEAL

 There were 27 telephone calls between Michael and his father. The jury found that 24 of the calls were confidential and awarded $5,000 in damages for each call, a total of $120,000. The Court of Appeal’s conclusion that only two of the 27 telephone calls were confidential was based on the standard of O’Laskey, supra, 224 Cal.App.3d 241, which we have rejected in this opinion. The Court of Appeal must now reconsider the issues on appeal in light of our conclusion that a conversation is confidential under section 632 if a party to that conversation has an objectively reasonable expectation that the conversation is not being overheard or recorded. [27 Cal.4th 777]

The judgment of the Court of Appeal is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

George, C.J., Baxter, J., Werdegar, J., Chin, J., Brown, J., and Moreno, J., concurred.

FN 1. All statutory citations are to the Penal Code.

FN 2. Section 632.7, enacted in 1992, prohibits intentionally intercepting or recording communications involving cellular telephones and cordless telephones. This prohibition applies to all communications, not just confidential communications. Michael’s complaint, however, asserted only a cause of action under section 632, not under section 632.7. Honorine does not claim section 632 is inapplicable to the calls Michael placed from a cellular telephone to a landline telephone.

FN 3. The record before us does not reveal why the jury found only 24 of the 27 calls confidential. There was evidence that three calls were re-dials after a cellular phone connection was lost, so it is possible that the jury considered those calls to be a continuation of the previous calls.

FN 4. We disapprove language in O’Laskey, supra, 224 Cal.App.3d 241 that is contrary to the views expressed in this opinion.

To hear Thurston County’s juvenile probation officer Sara Dotson tell it, she’s a modicum of restraint, a shy calm under fire peace maker who’s exceptionally gifted at defusing tense situations with ‘difficult’ personalities. While not the only variance from the facts by any stretch, her sworn statement of 10-12-11, wherein she declares a Good Samaritan accommodating a disabled young mother ‘threatened/intimidated’ her, says his behavior goes beyond any sort of normal reasoning–especially because he was not even a party to the case in question! [A case in which Sara Dotson was coaching/advising a rebellious teenager and assisting in terminating her handicapped mother’s parental rights without investigation/justification] “I have dealt with difficult people for many, many years and NEVER had any type of interaction like this before,” she dissembles. 

Click: Perjury Under Fire for a peek at the entire stinking mass of corruption in AH11-0208 cooked up/orchestrated by the man behind the curtain, detective Roland Weiss, esq., dissembling drama queen juvenile probation officer Sara Dotson, and the head hunting emasculating persecutor bent on letting no good deed go unpunished in Thurston County, Jennifer Lord, esq. This 3 stooges rat pack couldn’t work within closer proximity of one another unless they were literally sitting in each other’s lap–which may often be the case! If one sneezes, the other 2 catch cold.

But wait! One little detail is the dysfunctional origins of this ‘pillar of the community’. Dotson’s recently deceased father had quite a different opinion of her. Here’s his take on this light of his life who ‘NEVER had any any type of interaction like this before’:

Dead Father Reveals the underbelly of his ‘virtuous’ princess.

Her response? It’s been said people invariably return to what they know. And so it is here in Sara Dotson’s sworn response sounding very much like what she swore in #AH11-0208 and now #11-1-01711-1! Someone’s always ‘blocking’ her path, it would seem–this beacon of calmness under fire and unmitigated virtue. Perhaps her pals in the courthouse just don’t know her well enough–or maybe they know her entirely too well. The folks that really knew her were close at hand–her family. When asked during an interview on 3-12-12 about the petition, Sara lied, claiming her father hadn’t filed it, but her sister, Betsy Prehm. Betsy did file a lawsuit against her sister for a loan of $4,000 Sara hadn’t repaid, but that was much later–though similar to the father’s complaint of being out $100,000 to Sara. Don’t buy a used car from this woman.

Sara Dotson’s Tried & True attack/defense

Compare the above to the audio of her sworn statement in open Court in AH11-0208 on 10-25-11, about 20 seconds in–sound familiar? Click HERE.

But Sara won’t have to kick her dad around anymore, or her mother for that matter. They’re gone. They died within 4 days of each other and received a joint service for their family and mourners.

Donald J.  RolstadView Guestbook Keepsake PageBirth: 12/25/1925Death: 7/7/2010 Interred: Service Information: A joint celebration of life for Donald and Mary Rolstad will be held on July 24th, 2010 at 1:00 pm at the Westwood Baptist Church at 333 Kaiser Rd NW, Olympia, WA 98502. Interment:

Visitation Information: Obituary: Donald J. Rolstad December 25, 1925 ~ July 7, 2010 A forty year resident of Olympia, Washington, Don Rolstad (84) passed away on July 7, 2010 from complications sustained in a fall. Don was born in Bremerton, Washington on December 25, 1925. Following his high school graduation in 1944, he was drafted into the United States Army. Don earned his Bachelor’s degree from the University of Washington and a Master’s in Social Work from Indiana University. Don served as President of the Thurston County Soccer Association for several years as well as President of the Western Correctional Association and Chairman of the National Council on Crime and Delinquency Planning Commission. He was also a Deacon for Englewood Christian Church in Yakima, Washington. Don enjoyed operating/collecting/repairing and selling old model trains. He also enjoyed fishing, gardening and playing poker! His wife, Mary, survived him by four days. He is further survived by his sister, Karen Rolstad, His four children, Peter, Sara (Randy) Dotson, David and Betsy Prehm. His eight grandchildren, Derik, Carissa, Lindsey, Reece, Joseph, Riley, Amanda and Jake, two great grandsons, Eladio and Elies and was expecting his first great grand-daughter in August. Don suggests any donations be made to Community Youth Services or Haven House. Please leave your memories of Don or condolences for the family by clicking on the “view guestbook” link below. View Guestbook Keepsake Page

The following depositions were taken in Tumwater & Olympia, WA. on 3-6-12 at ~11:15am and ~2:00pm respectively. Amy’s was recorded on 3-22-12 @ ~2:30pm in the TCTV Studio. They contain eye witness or fact witness statements material to a 3 minute incident in the Thurston FJC (Family & Juvenile Courthouse) on 9-27-11 wherein juvenile probation officer Sara Dotson and her courthouse pals trumped up charges to target/persecute a Good Samaritan providing accommodation to a disabled young mother on that day @ ~10:30am. The videotaped depositions speak for themselves.

030912Saradep by pinbalwyz

Hair dresser Sara Hooker confirms defendant’s reputation as a passionate opinionated but dutiful and helpful non-threatening community activist, photojournalist, and paralegal. She also belies Sara Dotson’s poor memory as to defendant’s ‘scary’ weight, hair & beard length on 9-27-11.

3-9-12 Keith Schacher Deposition 1/3 by pinbalwyz

Keith Schacher testifies about lying public juvenile official, probation officer Sara Dotson, in #11-1-01711-1 as an instance of prosecutorial misconduct wherein her courthouse pals engage in malicious prosecution on her behalf to punish a Good Samaritan for accommodating a disabled young mother on 9-27-11 in the Thurston FJC courthouse public hallway.

3-9-12 Keith Schacher Deposition 2/3 by pinbalwyz

3-9-12 Keith Schacher Deposition 3/3 by pinbalwyz

3-22-12 Amy Cunningham Deposition 1/3

Amy Cunningham recalls the denial of accommodation, abuse, perjury, intimidation, and coercion at the hands of Thurston County juvenile probation officer Sara Dotson and DSHS Children’s Services apparatchik Heather Reid on and subsequent to 9-27-11 at the Thurston Co. Family & Juvenile Courthouse (FJC).

3-22-12 Amy Cunningham Deposition 2/3

3-22-12 Amy Cunningham Deposition 3/3 

Recent Port of Shelton Commissioner Jack Miles/Strickland was convicted of DUI (Driving Under the Influence of alcohol) after a disputed breathalyzer test registered 0.10+; the legal limit in Washington State is presumed 0.08. He was represented by Bruce Finlay, esq., the husband attorney of Mason County Superior Court Judge Amber Finlay. District Court Judge Victoria Meadows presided over the jury trial and sentencing. Patricia Small, a Tacoma resident commuting to Shelton, was the young Mason County deputy prosecutor handling the case.

3-6-12 DUI Sentencing of Jack Miles/Strickland by pinbalwyz

The Judge’s courtroom demeanor was sterling as was the deputy prosecutor’s. Judge Meadows’ sentencing was proportionate and consistent with that handed out to others convicted of similar offenses in her Court. She revealed no discernible bias or hostile attitude at this hearing. She was cordial to all of those in her courtroom. Ms. Small handled her caseload quickly, efficiently, and publicly gave a measure of respect and consideration to all defendants who approached her while openly negotiating plea bargains with them.

Mr. Miles did not appeal to the Court for leniency when given the opportunity to address the Court before sentencing was passed. Patricia Small, DPA, argued for an imposition of 5 days jail time based on Mr. Miles’ history and her assertion the conviction involved a ‘collision’. Mr. Finlay asserted there was none and successfully argued for the statutory minimum, 1 day in jail. Judge Meadows suspended 364 of a 365 day sentence based on completion of the terms of the judgment including a 5 year probationary period, a total combined fine of almost $5,000, no law or similar violations, a proscription against consumption or presence of alcohol including bars and parties to be re-evaluated after 1 year, and a payment schedule of $75/mo. over the course of 5 years probation until paid in full.

Mr. Finlay announced he would be appealing the conviction based on several factors including alleged prosecutorial misconduct during the jury phase of the trial when the State, in an apparent attempt to impeach Mr. Miles, falsely and recklessly asserted/questioned his “dishonorable discharge’ from the Marine Corps. Besides the fact this assertion was absolutely false (Mr. Miles received a stipulated ‘less than honorable’ discharge as a resolution of his refusal to inform on his fellow soldiers as to whether they were ‘gay’ at that time–an issue that has since become moot pursuant to Presidential Order) resulting in the Corps taking the disciplinary action against him for his refusal to testify against his comrades, even had the prosecutor’s false allegation been true, it was misconduct by the prosecutor requiring a mistrial. Mr. Finlay objected at that time, demanding a mistrial be declared, but his objection was overruled–a basis for appeal because of the resulting denial of a fair trial where the jury was not prejudiced by introduction of evidence having absolutely nothing to do with whether Mr. Miles was actually guilty of the State’s charges.

Outside the courtroom, Mr. Miles protested the weight of the fine and declared it was tantamount to a State run ‘racket’, i.e. all about the money! Mr. Finlay confided the defense had excellent grounds for appeal for not only the above cited reasons, but the irregular/questionable use of a breathalyze instrument by an inexperienced  arresting officer who failed to follow prescribed protocol in its application.

Mr. Miles vowed to return to Arizona. His disappointment after a disheartening lack of community reciprocity following his championing its protection was apparent. Jack bridled at the thought of paying off a fine he argued was unjust. It’s uncertain if/when local residents will see another elected official running the political risks Jack undertook to champion their cause.

In the following courtroom audio clip from Thurston County District Court case #AH11-0208 (a civil anti-harassment petition brought by Dotson), juvenile probation officer Sara Dotson can be heard swearing, under oath, to the fact Thurston Deputy Prosecutor Jennifer Lord and Detective Weiss (by reference therein) coached, influenced, and tampered with the State’s complaining witness in a private civil action in order to setup their agenda in a concocted Thurston Superior Court criminal proceeding: #11-1-01711-1

Despite the fact Lord was the State’s attorney, not Dotson’s, and Weiss was the State’s investigator, not Dotson’s, they engaged in the barratry of urging  the State’s complaining witness to act against her own interests at the expense of the defendant, at least according to Dotson’s sworn statement, the core of which can be heard 35 seconds into the audio stream.

This is an apparently typical MO of Thurston County prosecutors and how they ‘develop’ witnesses. In this instance, Dotson was not even the one who initially contacted the Sheriff’s office, it was Tim Morgan, a long time  nemesis of the defendant’s. All defendants in Thurston County should be warned of this kind of corruption/conflict of interest in that County Prosecutor’s office.

Click on the audio link below to hear Sara Dotson’s sworn admission she had been influenced, coached, and advised on what to say/do by Thurston County deputy prosecutor Jennifer Lord.

District Court AH11-0208 audio of alleged witness tampering in sworn statement

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Dead Dad Exposes Corrupt Thurston Juvenile Probation Officer

By Tom Carter 3-3-12 (wsws.org)

A bill passed Monday in the US House of Representatives and Thursday in the Senate would make it a felony—a serious criminal offense punishable by lengthy terms of incarceration—to participate in many forms of protest associated with the Occupy Wall Street protests of last year. Several commentators have dubbed it the “anti-Occupy” law, but its implications are far broader.

The bill—H.R. 347, or the “Federal Restricted Buildings and Grounds Improvement Act of 2011”—was passed by unanimous consent in the Senate, while only Ron Paul and two other Republicans voted against the bill in the House of Representatives (the bill passed 388-3). Not a single Democratic politician voted against the bill.

The virtually unanimous passage of H.R. 347 starkly exposes the fact that, despite all the posturing, the Democrats and the Republicans stand shoulder to shoulder with the corporate and financial oligarchy, which regarded last year’s popular protests against social inequality with a mixture of fear and hostility.

Among the central provisions of H.R. 347 is a section that would make it a criminal offense to “enter or remain in” an area designated as “restricted.”

The bill defines the areas that qualify as “restricted” in extremely vague and broad terms. Restricted areas can include “a building or grounds where the President or other person protected by the Secret Service is or will be temporarily visiting” and “a building or grounds so restricted in conjunction with an event designated as a special event of national significance.”

The Secret Service provides bodyguards not just to the US president, but to a broad layer of top figures in the political establishment, including presidential candidates and foreign dignitaries.

Even more sinister is the provision regarding events of “national significance.” What circumstances constitute events of “national significance” is left to the unbridled discretion of the Department of Homeland Security. The occasion for virtually any large protest could be designated by the Department of Homeland Security as an event of “national significance,” making any demonstrations in the vicinity illegal.

For certain, included among such events would be the Democratic and Republican National Conventions, which have been classified as National Special Security Events (NSSE), a category created under the Clinton administration. These conventions have been the occasion for protests that have been subjected to ever increasing police restrictions and repression. Under H.R. 347, future protests at such events could be outright criminalized.

The standard punishment under the new law is a fine and up to one year in prison. If a weapon or serious physical injury is involved, the penalty may be increased to up to ten years.

Also criminalized by the bill is conduct “that impedes or disrupts the orderly conduct of Government business or official functions” and “obstructs or impedes ingress or egress to or from any restricted building or grounds.” These provisions, even more so than the provisions creating “restricted areas,” threaten to criminalize a broad range of protest activities that were previously perfectly legal.

In order to appreciate the unprecedented sweep of H.R. 347, it is necessary to consider a few examples:

 A wide area around the next G-20 meeting or other global summit could be designated “restricted” by the Secret Service, such that any person who “enters” a that area can be subject to a fine and a year in jail under Section 1752(a)(1) (making it a felony to enter any restricted building or grounds without lawful authority to do so).

 Senator Rick Santorum, the ultra-right Republican presidential candidate, enjoys the protection of the Secret Service. Accordingly, a person who shouts “boo!” during a speech by Santorum could be subject to arrest and a year of imprisonment under Section 1752(a)(2) (making it a felony to “engag[e] in disorderly or disruptive conduct in” a restricted area).

 Striking government workers who form a picket line near any event of “national significance” can be locked up under Section 1752(a)(3) (making it a crime to imped[e] ingress or egress to or from any restricted building or grounds).

Under the ancien regime in France, steps were taken to ensure that the “unwashed masses” were kept out of sight whenever a carriage containing an important aristocrat or church official was passing through. Similarly, H.R. 347 creates for the US president and other top officials a protest-free bubble or “no-free-speech zone” that follows them wherever they go, making sure the discontented multitude is kept out of the picture.

The Federal Restricted Buildings and Grounds Improvement Act is plainly in violation of the First Amendment to the US Constitution, which was passed in 1791 in the aftermath of the American Revolution. The First Amendment provides: “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech . . . or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.” (The arrogance of the Democratic and Republican politicians is staggering—what part of “Congress shall make no law” do they not understand?)

H.R. 347 comes on the heels of the 2012 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), which was signed by President Obama into law on December 31, 2011. The NDAA gives the president the power to order the assassination and incarceration of any person—including a US citizen—anywhere in the world without charge or trial.

The passage of H.R. 347 has been the subject of a virtual blackout in the media. In light of the unprecedented nature of the bill, which would effectively overturn the First Amendment, this blackout cannot be innocent. The media silence therefore represents a conscious effort to keep the American population in the dark as to the government’s efforts to eviscerate the Bill of Rights.

The bill would vastly expand a previous law making it misdemeanor to trespass on the grounds of the White House. An earlier version of the bill would have made it a felony just to “conspire” to engage in any of the conduct described above. The bill now awaits President Obama’s signature before it becomes the law of the land.

What lies behind the unprecedented attack underway on the US Constitution and Bill of Rights is a growing understanding in the ruling class that the protests that took place around the world against social inequality in 2011 will inevitably re-emerge in more and more powerful forms in 2012 and beyond, as austerity measures and the crashing economy make the conditions of life more and more impossible for the working class. The virtually unanimous support in Congress H.R. 347, among Democrats as well as Republicans, reflects overriding sentiment within the ruling establishment for scrapping all existing democratic rights in favor of dictatorial methods of rule.

This sentiment was most directly expressed this week by Wyoming Republican legislator David Miller, who recently introduced a bill into the state legislature that would give the state the power, in an “emergency,” to create its own standing army through conscription, print its own currency, acquire military aircraft, suspend the legislature, and establish martial law. “Things happen quickly sometimes—look at Libya, look at Egypt, look at those situations,” Miller told the Star-Tribune in Casper, Wyoming. Repeating arguments employed by every military dictatorship over the past century, Miller declared, “We wouldn’t have time to meet as a Legislature or even in special session to do anything to respond.” Miller’s so-called “doomsday law” was defeated in the Wyoming legislature Tuesday by the narrow margin of 30-27.

Trial Tactics sanctioned by Jerry Spence, esq.

Links to the audio files analyzing those tactics are listed at the end of this article.

Sometimes there’s simply no substitute for excellence. Jerry Spence is possibly the best criminal defense trial attorney in America, if he’s still alive. He  successfully defended Randy Weaver, Imelda Marcos, and represented the estate of Karen Silkwood. It’s said he never lost a case.

These trial tactics are intended for those indigents too poor to afford an attorney, too knowledgeable to allow a public defender to shut them out of some of the most critical decisions affecting whether Jail time is in their future, and for those who want to participate in the process determining their fate. These audio files are intended to give the poor, the dispossessed, the disenfranchised, and the oppressed the tools to defend themselves who insist on that right. They are not a SOP or a substitute for a lawyer, but they are a first step to help those described try to avoid the mire that’s now our judicial cesspool.

What’s asked in return is commitment to the proposition we do not force our friends, family, and neighbors to go to court (especially in criminal cases) or ANY other government institution alone. We will lock arms in solidarity with a band of brothers and sisters determined to seek justice in the belly of the beast. Without this commitment, you (no matter how radical or much of a community/political activist you might be) are NOT welcome to these files or the community of legal activists willing to make such a pledge. You are excluded just as you exclude others in their hours of need before a prison-industrial-judicial complex that eats its children.

Those who are able & willing to assume their civic duty in this cause are urged to enlist others of similar faith. We must hang together or we will all hang separately! Do not allow those being flung into the maw  of this abattoir to become separated/isolated and disposed of. A Hive intelligence needs every member, and for each to remain in close contact/communication with the rest. Separated, the Hive will die as will each of its members! Separation can take many forms besides the physical. The beast can attempt to cut/control communication links. Official propaganda can corrode the spiritual, ethical, and social solidarity of the Hive. It can try to terrorize the Hive by making examples of its various participants. It can seize the assets (common strategy) of its participants through fines, fees, and foreclosures leveraged against the liberty of its patriots. It can instill fear of loss through the raw brute police power of the state imposed against the individual. Instilling panic, it promotes a reaction of ‘Devil Take the Hindmost’. Discipline and faith in a future without repression of inalienable rights must be an abiding presence in the Hive. The passions of those within can defeat the machine.

Audio Links:

Trial Tactics 1/12, Trial Tactics 2/12, Trial Tactics 3/12, Trial Tactics 4/12, x-Trial Tactics 5/12, x-Trial Tactics 6/12, x-Trial Tactics 7/12, x-Trial Tactics 8/12, advx-Trial Tactics 9/12, advx-Trial Tactics 10/12, advx-Trial Tactics 11/12, advx-Trial Tactics 12/12

The judicial cesspool in which citizens find themselves mired has reached unprecedented proportions in the depth and breadth of public officials’ perjury. The corruption the Occupy activists protest extends to all 3 branches of our government, but is particularly galling in the judicial branch where hearings/trials are supposed to be searches for the truth. In fact, the Court system  has become so petty and intrusive, it invites perjury and does little/nothing about it in almost all instances.

Anti-harassment actions (RCW 10.14) typically involve the most petty of disputes often involving the mentally unstable and hysterics to the vindictive and naive. Some critics suspect the entire circus where most litigants (over 90%) are pro se is designed to distract the body politic from its social ills while fighting among themselves for the most trivial of reasons.

About 1/3rd of Thurston County Jail’s inmates are held for allegedly violating a TPO (temporary protection order) that was likely precipitated by the kinds of conflicts that once involved one of the parties locking themselves into their room/bathroom. Today, it has become an opportunity for even more intrusion by a government intent on assuming control over every aspect of its citizen’s lives. The typical degree of pettiness and ex parte proceedings contrasts dramatically with the original legislative intent of this law, generated out of concern for the circumstances surrounding the tragic death of Elissa Tissot in a TESC cafeteria some years ago.

Professional sycophants recognize a bonanza when they see one. Gregory Gilbertson teaches law related classes at Centralia Community College and styles himself as an expert interviewer (PI) on the side, sending annual gifts to many area attorneys in a bid to curry favor for hiring his services at $60/hr. Some are less impressed with his self promotion.

Despite  the earnest assertions heard in the following interview of a defendant guilty of nothing more than accommodating a disabled woman in a Thurston County courthouse public hallway on 9-27-11 in #11-1-01711-1, Gibertson trashes the client’s relationship with his attorney by later misrepresenting the discussion with that client in his e-mail letter of demand to the attorney for payment. Both chose to scapegoat the client despite that client’s transparent notice (heard at the end of the 1-hr interview) the PI was employed by the attorney, not the client.

1-26-12 interview w/attorney’s client in the case of:

NO GOOD DEED SHALL GO UNPUNISHED IN THURSTON CO. 11-1-01711-1

SOUL ON ICE author Eldridge Cleaver wrote, “I’m perfectly aware that I’m in prison, that I’m a Negro, that I’ve been a rapist, and that I have a Higher Uneducation.”

Angela Davis called it the prison-industrial complex. America incarcerates a higher percentage of its population than any other nation. Around 25% of US black males of a certain age are in prison or the probation-corrections system at any given time.

Stokley Carmichael used the term ‘white nigger’ to describe the ‘hippies’ of his day and might have agreed with some of Jerry Rubin’s sentiments when the latter observed:

“We are stealing the youth of America right out of the kindergartens and elementary schools.” After some remarks about how “America’s courts are colonial courts,” her jails “black concentration camps,” he goes on to declare that “smoking pot is a political act, and every smoker is an outlaw. The drug culture is a revolutionary threat to plastic wasp america.”

“Who the hell wants to “make it” in America anymore? The hippie-yippie-SDS movement is a “white nigger” movement. The American economy no longer needs young whites and blacks. We are waste material. We fulfill our destiny in life by rejecting a system which rejects us.”

Having exhausted an industrial-manufacturing base with outsourcing and bankrupted its service economy, America turns to consuming its environment and feeding its few remaining resources to the fire including its own citizens.

Accordingly, Rubin called for widespread demonstrations near jails and court houses to “demand immediate freedom for Huey P. Newton, Eldridge Cleaver, Rap Brown, all black prisoners, Timothy Leary, the Oakland Seven, all drug prisoners, all draft resisters, Benjamin Spock, … . me,” etc.

The Movement is dead; the Revolution is unborn. The streets are bloody and ablaze, but it is difficult to see why, and impossible to know for what end. Government on every level is ineffectual, helpless to act either in the short term or the long. The force of Army and police seems not to suppress violence, but incite it… . It is the worst of times.

It is the best of times. The wretched of this American earth are together as they have never been before, … No march, no sit-in, no boycott ever touched so many… . The subtle methods of co-optation work no better to keep it intact than the brutal methods of repression; if it is any comfort, liberalism proves hardly more effective than fascism. Above all, there is a sense that the continuity of an age has been cut, that we have arrived at an infrequent fulcrum of history, and that what comes now will be vastly different from what went before.

It is not a time for reflection, but for evocation. The responsibility of the intellectual is the same as that of the street organizer, the draft resister, the Digger: to talk to people, not about them. The important literature now is the underground press, the speeches of Malcolm, the works of Fanon, the songs of the Rolling Stones and Aretha Franklin.

Julius Ceasar, in one of the earliest written descriptions of the Druids, described a society where the Gods demanded a heavy toll from their earthly followers. Human fodder was needed–and who better to pay the ultimate price than felons and thieves.

Julius Ceasar noted of the Celts: “They believe that the execution of those who have been caught in the act of theft or robbery or some crime is more pleasing to the immortal gods but when the supply of such fails, they resort to the execution even of the innocent.”

especially the judicial cesspool in Washington State’s capitol county, Thurston.

 

Indigent defendants are hurried along in assembly line fashion into the maw of its growth industry, government and jails. Even the Nisqually have opted to cash in on the private prison/jail system bonOne could easily argue a similar analogy for today’s American criminal justice sThurston. Indigent defendants ystem, anza. Those who can afford an attorney are generally tolerated until picked clean.

Officials in Mason County obsequiously suck up to State Prison officials in a bid for their own share of the mince meat pie.

When the Mission Creek Corrections Center for Women opens near Belfair, it will be Mason County’s second state prison. The Washington Corrections Center at Shelton has been a quiet part of that community for more than 40 years.

Currently, the medium security men’s prison is the greater Shelton area’s largest employer — 685 employees in a 2004 survey, surpassing local icon Simpson Timber Company (sixth at 418) and the newly expanded Little Creek Casino and Resort (650).

In the view of Kasey Cronquist, executive director of the Shelton-Mason County Chamber of Commerce, the prison is “a silent economic engine” that seldom crosses residents’ minds. Its location on Dayton Airport Road, well away from downtown Shelton, keeps it out of the public eye.

“People move here and have no idea it exists” said Cronquist, who spent his late childhood years in Shelton and graduated from high school there.

Cronquist said the prison “benefits the community tremendously, both in community development and economic development.”

Not only is it the area’s largest employer, Cronquist said, but it pays “family wages” based on a state scale. A liaison at the correction center has helped local businesses fill the prison’s needs for goods and services. In the past, an inmate woodworking shop produced street benches and other projects for city use.

Cronquist said there is another plus factor: State funds for infrastructure come to areas with state facilities. A proposed water and sewer project for the Shelton area likely will get a financial boost from the prison’s presence, he said.

Mason County Commissioner Tim Sheldon told an informational meeting last month in Belfair that the women’s prison may be a welcome inclusion in any future sewer system along Hood Canal. The prison is four miles up Sand Hill Road from the canal.

Mission Creek will have 80 inmates initially and employ about 40 people, said Superintendent James Walker. A few employees who transferred from the closing Tacoma Pre-Release Center are Kitsap County, Gig Harbor or Belfair-area residents.

“Some are glad to be (working) closer to home,” Walker said.

“We got a thing…going on!” -Billy Paul-

Washington is now the 7th state in the union to allow gay marriages. Governor Chris Gregoire signed the debatable bill into law on Monday (2-13-12). The signing was surrounded by much jubilation from proponents of the bill. A solid opposition promises to have it repealed

However, it will not go into effect until at least June, pending a standard enactment period. A law does not go into effect in Washington until 90 days after the state’s legislative session ends.

Opponents of the bill have said they will seek its repeal through a ballot measure in November of this year. That push could delay the law’s enactment or possibly derail it entirely. Its opposition is likely to become a rallying point for the state’s conservative politicians.